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ABSTRACT 
 
Assessment of the Fingerprinting Method for Spent Fuel Verification in MACSTOR 
KN-400 CANDU Dry Storage. (August 2012) 
Nandan Gowthahalli Chandregowda, B.S; M.S., Mangalore University, India 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. William S. Charlton 
           Dr. Sunil S. Chirayath 
 
The Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power has built a new modular type of dry storage 
facility, known as MACSTOR KN-400 at Wolsong reactor site. The building has the 
capacity to store up to 24000 CANDU spent fuel bundles in a 4 rows by 10 columns 
arrangement of silos. The MACSTOR KN-400 consists of 40 silos; each silo has 10 
storage baskets, each of which can store 60 CANDU spent fuel bundles. 
The development of an effective method for spent fuel verification at the 
MACSTOR KN-400 storage facility is necessary in order for the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) to meet with safeguards regulations. The IAEA is interested in 
having a new effective method of re-verification of the nuclear material in the 
MACSTOR KN-400 dry storage facility in the event of any loss of continuity of 
knowledge, which occasionally happens when the installed seals fail.  
 In the thesis work, MCNP models of central and corner structures of the 
MACSTOR KN-400 facility are developed, since both have different types of re-
verification system. Both gamma and neutron simulations were carried out using the 
MCNP models developed for MACSTOR KN-400.  The CANDU spent fuel bundle with 
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discharge burnup of 7.5 GWD/t (burned at specific power of 28.39 MW/t) and 10 years 
cooled was considered for radiation source term estimation. 
 For both the structures, MCNP simulations of gamma transport were done by 
including Cadmium-Zinc-Telluride (CZT) detector inside the re-verification tube. 
Gamma analyses for different spent fuel bundle diversion scenarios were carried out. It 
was observed that for diversion scenarios wherein the bundles are removed from the 
inner portions of the basket (opposite side of the collimator of the re-verification tube), it 
was difficult to conclude whether diversion has taken place based on the change in 
gamma radiation signals. Similar MCNP simulations of neutron transport were carried 
out by integrating helium-3 detector inside the re-verification tube and the results 
obtained for various diversion scenarios were encouraging and can be used to detect 
some spent fuel diversion cases. In the central structure, it was observed that addition of 
moderating material between the spent fuel and the detector increased the sensitivity of 
the detecting system for various diversion cases for neutron simulations. 
 In the worst scenario, the diverting state could divert 14 spent fuel bundles from 
each of 10 baskets in a silo from the basket region opposite to the collimator of the re-
verification tube. The non-detection probability for this scenario is close to 1. This 
diversion cannot be easily detected using the currently designed detection system. In 
order to increase the detection probability, either the design of the facility must be 
changed or other safeguard methods, such as containment and surveillance methods 
must be used for safeguarding the nuclear material at the facility. 
 
 v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 I would like to take this opportunity to thank my advisor Dr. William S. Charlton 
for the opportunity he provided for me to work on this project. His guidance and advices 
are really precious. I would also like to thank Dr. Sunil S. Chirayath for his kind hearted 
support and care. His guidance and advices are the strength behind the completion of this 
work. There is a lot to learn from Dr. Charlton and Dr. Chirayath. I would also like to 
acknowledge Dr. Paul Nelson for helping me to start graduate school at Texas A&M 
University and to overcome all the difficulties associated with coming from India to the 
United States of America. I would also like to thank my committee members Dr. Craig 
M. Marianno and Dr. Sunil P. Khatri for their support and valuable advice. I would also 
like to thank Dr. Young Ham and Dr. Shiva Sitaraman, Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory (LLNL) for sponsoring the project and for their co-operation and valuable 
guidance. 
 This is one of the best opportunities for me to thank my dearest friend Ms. Joe 
Justina (Bataanii) for her continued support. She is one of the real strengths in my life. 
My lovely parents, Mr. Chandregowda and Mrs. Sumitra, my sister Ms. Navyashree, my 
brother Mr. Naveen GC, and my sister in law Mrs. Bindu Naveen, who always believed 
in me and supported me all through my life, deserve a hearty thanks and appreciation. I 
also like to thank my life-partner Ms. Ramya BC for being patient and being with me 
during my bad days. I would also take this opportunity to thank all my family members 
and friends for being with me and supporting me. 
 vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
                     Page 
ABSTRACT ..............................................................................................................  iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................  v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..........................................................................................  vi 
LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................  ix 
LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................  xiii 
CHAPTER 
 I INTRODUCTION ................................................................................   1 
 
   I.A. Motivation and Objectives ......................................................  1 
   I.B. CANDU Reactor and Fuel ......................................................  3 
   I.C. Types of Dry Storage Facility for Spent Fuel .........................  5  
    I.C.1 Casks ............................................................................  5 
    I.C.2 Silos ..............................................................................  6 
    I.C.3 Dry Storage Vaults .......................................................  6 
    I.C.4 MACSTOR (Modular Air Cooled STORage) KN-400  7 
   I.D. Problems Associated with Spent Fuel Re-verification in  
          MACSTOR KN-400 ...............................................................  7 
   I.E. Previous Work .........................................................................  9 
   I.F. Thesis Overview ......................................................................  11 
 
II RADIATION SOURCE-TERM GENERATION FOR CANDU6 
 SPENT FUEL BUNDLE .....................................................................  13 
 
  II.A. Gamma and Neutron Radiation Source-term Estimation 
           Using Burnup Code ...............................................................  13 
  II.B. Significant Quantity ...............................................................    15 
 
 III MCNP MODELING OF MACSTOR KN-400 STORAGE 
  FACILITY ............................................................................................      17 
 
   III.A. MCNP Model of a CANDU 6 Fuel Bundle .........................  17 
 
 vii 
CHAPTER                                                                                                                    Page 
   III.B. MCNP Model of a Spent Fuel Storage Basket .....................  18 
   III.C. MCNP Model of a Silo .........................................................  19  
   III.D. MCNP Model of the Central Structure of the  
             MACSTOR KN-400 Facility ...............................................  19 
   III.E. MCNP Model of the Peripheral Structure of the  
            MACSTOR KN-400 Facility ................................................  21 
   III.F. MCNP Modeling of Gamma and Neutron Detectors ............  22 
 
 IV GAMMA RADIATION TRANSPORT SIMUATIONS USING 
  MCNP ...................................................................................................  24 
   
   IV.A. Diversion Analysis Using Central Structure of the  
             MACSTOR KN-400 Facility ...............................................  24
   IV.B. Vertical Gamma Profile of Central Re-verification System.  27 
   IV.C. Diversion Analysis Using Peripheral Structure of the  
             MACSTOR KN-400 Facility ...............................................  30 
 
V NEUTRON RADIATION TRANSPORT SIMULATIONS 
 USING MCNP .....................................................................................  34 
 
   V.A. Diversion Analysis Using Central Structure of the  
            MACSTOR KN-400 Facility ................................................  36 
   V.B. Sensitivity of the Detection System with respect to the 
            Removal of the Spent Fuel Bundles from the Basket ...........  47 
   V.C. Inverse MCNP Model ............................................................  51 
   V.D. Vertical Neutron Profile ........................................................  53 
   V.E. Diversion Analysis Using Peripheral Structure of the  
           MACSTOR KN-400 Facility .................................................  55  
   V.F. Non-Detection Probability .....................................................  58 
 
 IV SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ...................................................  64 
 
REFERENCES ..........................................................................................................  67 
APPENDIX A ...........................................................................................................  70 
APPENDIX B ...........................................................................................................  73 
APPENDIX C ...........................................................................................................  74 
 
 viii 
                     Page 
APPENDIX D ...........................................................................................................  75 
VITA .........................................................................................................................  83 
 ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
FIGURE                                                                                                                        Page 
 1 Plan view of MACSTOR KN-400 CANDU spent fuel dry storage ..........  2 
 
 2 Structure of a CANDU fuel bundle ............................................................  4 
 
 3 Concrete casks at a U.S. nuclear power plant ............................................  6 
 
 4  Arrangement of collimators within MACSTOR KN-400 
  Re-verification columns .............................................................................  9 
 5 Top view of the spent-fuel basket inside the storage cask .........................  10 
 
 6 Side view of CANDU spent-fuel storage cask ...........................................  10 
 7 Photon spectrum for one CANDU-6 spent fuel bundle with discharge 
  Burnup 7.5 GWD/t Burned at Specific Power 28.39 MW/t and cooled 
  for 10 years .................................................................................................  14 
 8 Neutron spectrum for one CANDU-6 spent fuel bundle with discharge 
  Burnup 7.5 GWD/t Burned at Specific Power 28.39 MW/t and 
  cooled for 10 years .....................................................................................  14 
 9 3D view of a single 37—pins CANDU 6 fuel bundle model  
  generated by MCNP Visual Editor Software .............................................  17 
 10 3D view of spent fuel storage basket model generated by  
  MCNP Visual Editor Software ...................................................................  18 
 11 3D view of a silo model generated by MCNP Visual Editor Software ......  19 
 
 x 
FIGURE                                                                                                                        Page 
 12 3D view of the central structure model generated by  
  MCNP Visual Editor Software ...................................................................  20 
 13 3D view of the peripheral structure model generated by  
  MCNP Visual Editor Software ...................................................................  21 
 14 Image of CZT detector placed in line with the collimator of the 
  re-verification tube .....................................................................................  22 
 15 Image of neutron counter placed in line with the collimator 
  of the re-verification tube ...........................................................................  23 
 16 View of the models used for gamma transport simulation generated  
  by MCNP Visual Editor Software ..............................................................  25 
 17 Photon spectrum in the CZT detector for all the three cases .....................  26 
 18 Photon spectrum in CZT detector at 137Cs energy 662 keV .......................  27 
 19 MCNP Visual Editor Software generated view of the model used 
  for vertical gamma profile response of the system ....................................  28 
 20 Graphical representation of gamma counts at each detector inside 
  the re-verification tube ...............................................................................  29 
 21 Plan view of the model showing source particles from the adjacent  
  silos used for vertical gamma profile measurement inside peripheral 
  re-verification tube .....................................................................................  30 
 22 Axial view of the model showing the diversion of spent fuel bundles 
  from one of the storage baskets ..................................................................  31 
 xi 
FIGURE                                                                                                                        Page 
 23 Gamma counts at each detector inside the peripheral re-verification tube  33 
 24 View of the models showing concrete structure with and without 
  importance splitting ....................................................................................  35 
 25 View of the diversion scenario models used for neutron transport 
  simulation generated by MCNP Visual Editor Software ...........................  37 
 26 Comparison of neutron fluxes for 6 diversion scenarios and  
  no diversion scenario for the first set .........................................................  39 
 27 Comparison of neutron fluxes for 6 diversion scenarios and  
  no diversion scenario for the second set .....................................................  41 
 28 Images showing the position of polyethylene inside the collimator ..........  42 
 29 Schematic representation of neutron flux variation for the cases with 
  and without polyethylene inside the collimator .........................................  43 
 30 MCNP models used to check the effect of inclusion of polyethylene  
  inside the collimator ...................................................................................  44 
 31 Schematic representation of variation of neutron flux for no diversion  
  case and diversion cases with dummy stainless steel and depleted 
  uranium dioxide bundles replacement ........................................................  46 
 32 Images of the models used to determine the sensitivity of the detection 
  system with respect to the removal of spent fuel bundles ..........................  48 
 
 
 xii 
FIGURE                                                                                                                        Page 
 33 Schematic representation of variation of neutron flux for no diversion 
  case and 8 various diversion cases used to determine the sensitivity of 
  the detection system ...................................................................................  50 
 34 Neutron flux at 60 different positions in the inverse model .......................  52 
 35 Schematic representation of the variation of total neutron flux collected  
  at all 10 detectors inside central re-verification tube .................................  54 
 36 Schematic representation of variation of total neutron flux collected 
  at all 10 detectors inside peripheral re-verification tube ............................  57 
 37 Views of the model showing the replaced 14 dummy depleted uranium  
  dioxide bundles in each of the baskets in a silo .........................................  58 
 38 Variation of total neutron flux for no diversion and diversion case  
  used to estimate the non-detection probability ...........................................  60 
 39 Non-detection probability of the detection system with respect to 
  diversion from the storage baskets .............................................................  63 
 40 Detection probability of the detection system with respect to diversion  
  from the storage baskets .............................................................................  63 
 
 xiii 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
TABLE                                                                                                                          Page 
 
 ? Significant quantities as defined by IAEA .................................................  15 
Amount of actinides present in a 10 years cooled spent fuel bundle .........  16 
Gamma counts at each detector inside the central re-verification tube ......  29 
Gamma counts at each detector inside the peripheral  
re-verification tube .....................................................................................  32 
Comparison of neutron flux and respective statistical error obtained at  
the detector for the MCNP models with neutron importance splitting  
and without importance splitting ................................................................  35 
Neutron flux estimated for diversion scenarios at detector inside 
re-verification tube for the case where removed spent fuel bundles  
were replaced by stainless steel dummy bundle .........................................  38 
Neutron flux estimated for diversion scenarios at detector inside  
re-verification tube for the case where removed spent fuel bundles  
were replaced by depleted uranium dioxide dummy bundle ......................  40 
Neutron flux estimated at the detector inside re-verification tube  
for no diversion case ..................................................................................  43 
Neutron flux estimated at the detector inside re-verification tube  
for no diversion case and diversion cases ..................................................  45 
3 3He(n,p) H reaction rates at the detector inside re-verification tube ..........  47 
 
 ?? 
 
 ??? 
 ?? 
 ?
 
 
 ??
 
 
 ???
 
 
 ????
 
 ??
 
 ?
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xiv 
TABLE                                                                                                                          Page 
 XI Neutron flux estimated at the detector inside re-verification tube  
for no diversion case and 8 various diversion cases with 2-inch  
polyethylene at detector end inside the collimator .....................................  49 
3He reaction rate for no diversion case and different diversion cases ........  51 
Comparison of neutron fluxes at each detector inside the re-verification  
tube for no diversion case ...........................................................................  54 
Comparison of neutron fluxes at each detector inside the re-verification  
tube for diversion case ................................................................................  55 
Comparison of neutron fluxes for no diversion and diversion case  
for peripheral structure ...............................................................................  56 
3He reaction rate in all 10 detectors inside the peripheral re-verification  
tube for both no diversion and diversion case ............................................  57 
Neutron flux obtained for no diversion case used to estimate  
non-detection probability ...........................................................................  59 
Neutron flux obtained for diversion case used to estimate  
non-detection probability ...........................................................................  60 
Scheme of diversions, non-detection and detection probability ................  62 
  
  
 XII 
 XIII 
  
 XIV 
  
 XV 
  
XVI 
  
 XVII 
  
 XVIII 
  
 XIX 
 
 
 
 
 1 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
I.A. Motivation and Objectives 
 The Republic of Korea currently has four CANDU reactors at Wolsong reactor site. 
At the reactor site, spent fuel bundles discharged from the reactors are transferred to an 
interim dry storage facility after cooling in a spent fuel pool for several years. As the 
Wolsong reactor site does not have enough space for further extension of its existing 
interim dry storage facility, the Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power has built a new modular 
type of dry storage facility, known as MACSTOR KN-4001, shown in Fig. 1. The 
MACSTOR KN-400 module is based on the MACSTOR-200 design2 but has twice the 
storage capacity. The building has the capacity to store up to 24000 CANDU spent fuel 
bundles in a 4 rows by 10 columns arrangement of silos. Each silo has 10 storage baskets 
and each basket can store 60 CANDU spent fuel bundles.     
 The MACSTOR KN-400 has four re-verification tubes in the center and 24 re-
verification tubes at the periphery to verify the presence of stored spent fuel bundles.  A 
fingerprinting method for re-verification of stored spent fuel bundles has not been fully 
assessed for this new MACSTOR KN-400 type of spent fuel dry storage facility.  
Development of effective methods for spent fuel verification at the MACSTOR KN-400 
storage facility is necessary in order for the International Atomic Energy Agency 
_______________ 
This thesis follows the style of Nuclear Technology. 
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(IAEA) to assess the compliance with safeguards regulations. The IAEA is interested in 
having a new effective spent fuel re-verification method in the dry storage facility in the 
event of any loss of continuity of knowledge (COK), which occasionally happens when 
the seals installed fail. 
 
 
Fig. 1: Plan view of MACSTOR KN-400 CANDU spent fuel dry storage. 
 
 The objective of this thesis was to evaluate the gamma and neutron radiation 
fingerprinting method for spent fuel verification in MACSTOR KN-400 CANDU dry 
storage facility. The study included:  
(1) Estimation of gamma and neutron radiation source terms of CANDU reactor spent 
fuel using SCALE6 (ORIGEN-ARP)3,  
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(2) Modeling of the MACSTOR KN-400 geometry structure to perform gamma and 
neutron radiation transport simulations using Monte Carlo code MCNP4 to arrive at 
gamma and neutron signals at the detectors inside the re-verification tube, and  
(3) Sensitivity to the various spent fuel bundle diversion scenarios.  
 Based on results of the simulations, an estimate of non-detection probability will be 
made for diverting one significant quantity (SQ) of plutonium and uranium, significant 
quantity being 8 kg for plutonium and 20 t for depleted uranium. 
 Brief explanation of CANDU reactor and its fuel characteristics is made in the 
following paragraph for better understanding of the thesis subject matter. 
 
I.B. CANDU Reactor and Fuel 
 The CANada Deuterium-Uranium (CANDU) reactor under study is a Canadian 
designed pressurized heavy water nuclear reactor which uses natural uranium as fuel, 
heavy water as moderator, heavy water as primary coolant, and light water as secondary 
coolant. It has an installed capacity 700 MWe5. The CANDU fuel is made out of natural 
uranium in the form of uranium dioxide (UO2). The fuel pellets with size 1.54 cm 
(height) × 1.215 cm (diameter) are made of UO2, encased in a zircaloy-4 cladding to 
form fuel pins. A typical CANDU fuel pin contains 31 fuel pellets. These fuel pins are 
bundled together with the help of end plates to form a CANDU fuel bundle. There are 
about 5 CANDU fuel bundle designs. The CANDU reactors at Wolsung reactor site use 
the Bruce 37-element design. The Bruce 37-element design CANDU fuel bundle is 
49.53 cm long and has 10.25 cm diameter6. Whole fuel bundle weighs about 24 kg and 
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in that 19.2 kg in natural uranium. The structure of a CANDU fuel bundle along with a 
reactor vessel is shown in Fig. 2. 
  
 
Fig. 2. Structure of a CANDU fuel bundle 
 
 Typically, one fuel channel of the reactor will be refueled per day and eight of the 
twelve fuel bundles in a fuel channel are replaced during a refueling operation. After the 
irradiation of fuel in the reactor for about 12-24 months, nuclear fuel is removed from 
the reactor because of the reduction in fissile content as well as the build-up of fission 
products and transuranics that absorbs neutrons. When removed from the reactor, a fuel 
bundle will emit gamma and neutron radiation (principally from the fission products) 
along with heat. Reactor discharged fuel is unloaded into a spent fuel storage pool 
immediately adjacent to the reactor to allow the radiation levels to decrease. In the pool, 
the water shields the radiation and absorbs the heat. Spent fuel is cooled in the pool for 
5-10 years before moving into a dry storage facility cooled by air. However, both kinds 
of storage are intended only as an interim step before the spent fuel is either reprocessed 
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or sent to final disposal. The longer the spent fuel is stored, the easier it is to handle, due 
to the decay of radioactivity and decrease in heat emission.  
 
I.C. Types of Dry Storage Facility for Spent Fuel 
 There are different types of dry storage systems for spent fuel, namely: casks, silos, 
vault facilities (CANSTOR, MACSTOR 200, MACSTOR KN-400, etc.)7. Dry storage 
systems for spent fuel generally remove decay heat by passive cooling with air and will 
have steel or concrete as the radiation barrier. They also provide the advantage of 
incremental storage capacity expansion by allowing additional storage capacity to be 
constructed on a need basis, and have low operating costs. Spent fuel from the reactor 
must be stored in water pools for about five years to make it possible to store it in a dry 
storage facility. 
 
I.C.1 Casks 
 In a cask system, a flat bed of concrete is provided, and large casks that contain 
spent fuel can be added as needed to store the spent fuel. The casks provide both 
shielding and containment. The spent fuel in the casks is passively cooled by air. 
Originally, casks were designed only for spent fuel storage, but recently, some casks 
designs have been developed for both storage and transport (dual purpose) of spent fuel. 
Fig. 3 shows typical dry spent fuel storage casks at a nuclear power plant in the United 
States7. 
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I.C.2 Silos 
 In a silo storage system, the spent fuel is stored in concrete cylinders, either vertical 
or horizontal. Concrete cylinders are fitted with metal inner liners or separate metal 
canisters, concrete provides the radiation shielding while the sealed inner metal liner or 
canister provides containment. Spent fuel is cooled in the pools before storing in the 
silos. The spent fuel in silos is passively cooled by air. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Concrete casks at a U.S. nuclear power plant 
 
I.C.3 Dry Storage Vaults 
 Vaults consist of reinforced concrete buildings containing arrays of storage cavities 
suitable for containment of spent fuel units. The exterior concrete structure of the vault 
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serves as the radiation barrier. The fuel is typically stored in sealed metal storage tubes 
or storage cylinders, which may hold one or several fuel assemblies; these provide 
containment of the radioactive material in the spent fuel. Heat from the spent fuel 
assembly is removed in vault systems by either forced or natural air convection. The 
advantage of a vault system is that for storage of very large quantities of spent fuel at a 
single facility, the cost of vaults are comparatively lower than the cost of other type of 
storage system. 
 
I.C.4 MACSTOR (Modular Air Cooled STORage) KN-400 
 The MACSTOR KN-400 is a vault type of storage facility, which is based on 
MACSTOR-2002 (which is already in use at Gentilly Nuclear Generating Station, 
Canada8) module design, (shown earlier in Fig. 1), but has twice the capacity and twice 
the number of storage silos. The MACSTOR KN-400 facility contains 40 dry fuel 
storage silos, each of which houses 10 spent fuel baskets. The 40 storage silos are 
arranged in a 4 rows by 10 columns (refer Fig. 1), with 24 located close to periphery 
walls of the module and 16 located internally.  
 
I.D. Problems Associated with Spent Fuel Re-verification in MACSTOR KN-400 
 The MACSTOR KN-400 is a new type of CANDU spent fuel dry storage system for 
which an effective safeguard system needs to be developed. Re-verification is an IAEA 
safeguard requirement to ensure that the stored nuclear material in the facility is not 
diverted for undeclared purpose or activity by the state or organization. This is required 
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to monitor the presence of spent fuel in the storage silos by measuring the gamma and 
neutron signals of each irradiated fuel storage basket once the storage silos are loaded 
with spent fuel bundles. To achieve this on the existing MACSTOR-200 design, a re-
verification tube, running inside the module walls, is provided for each storage silo. The 
gamma or neutron profile is read by lowering a detector inside the tube so that the 
respective spectrum can be registered at the level of each basket. For the 24 peripheral 
storage silos, this method of measurement is retained on the MACSTOR KN-400 
module2. However, an alternate method is required for the 16 internal dry fuel storage 
silos since they are located some distance from the module walls.  In an attempt to solve 
this problem, central re-verification tubes were added to MACSTOR KN-400 (Refer Fig. 
1), which also facilitates the measurement of the gamma or neutron signal of fuel baskets 
in the surrounding 16 storage silos. The shielding portion of each column consists of a 
central hollow steel column surrounded by a square concrete column. The carbon steel 
re-verification tube is housed inside the central metal column. 
 In order to maximize the signal from specific fuel basket, the square columns are 
provided with viewing tubes, called collimators, which are used to increase the signal 
from the storage basket being measured. The collimators are arranged in a spiral manner 
along the height of the column, each one having a viewing angle towards the position of 
a specific fuel storage basket9 as shown in Fig. 4. The collimators provide an unshielded 
path from the targeted fuel storage basket to the inner re-verification tube. The gamma or 
neutron profile is read by lowering a detector inside the re-verification tube so that the 
signal can be registered at the level of each basket. The arrangement of background 
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shielding and direct reading via the collimators helps to maximize the radiation signal 
from each viewed basket while minimizing background radiation originating from the 
surrounding fuel storage baskets. 
 
 
Fig. 4: Arrangement of collimators within MACSTOR KN-400 Re-verification columns 
 
I.E. Previous Work 
 Gamma and neutron measurements on dry storage casks were conducted by Los 
Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) for the verification of CANDU spent fuel10. The 
dry storage cask system studied by LANL consisted of stainless steel storage baskets, 
typically loaded with 60 spent fuel bundles per basket as shown in Fig. 5. The spent fuel 
storage baskets are stacked into a concrete storage cask, usually 9 storage baskets per 
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cask. Two re-verification tubes are placed on opposite sides of the cask as shown in Fig. 
6. The system is for use in combination with IAEA seals to verify that the contents of a 
given cask have not changed over time. 
 
Fig. 5: Top view of the spent-fuel basket inside the storage cask 
 
 
Fig. 6: Side view of CANDU spent-fuel storage cask 
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 LANL performed Monte Carlo transport calculations of neutrons and gamma 
radiation for one of these CANDU spent fuel casks to compare the performance of 
proposed neutron and gamma radiation re-verification systems. Three small 4-atm 3He 
neutron counters were used for neutron measurements and three detectors similar in size 
and shape to the 3He tube were used for gamma measurements. The conclusions of their 
work were that the gamma measurements did not provide the necessary sensitivity to 
safeguard the entire cask and about 70% of the fuel bundles could be removed without 
any significant reduction in the gamma ray response at the detector. The neutron 
measurements provided good visibility of the spent fuel to safeguard the entire cask as 
the measurements can be performed in the two re-verification tubes on the opposite sides 
of the cask. However, the gamma ray measurement could be effective in monitoring the 
constant signal level from the spent fuel when continuity of knowledge (COK) is never 
lost. If there is any failure of the continuous monitoring system, then the re-verification 
of the spent fuel would require a neutron measurement. 
 From the discussions above, it can be noticed that the re-verification system planned 
in MACSTOR KN-400 is substantially different than that of cask and hence the study 
made by LANL on casks would not hold good for MACSTOR KN-400.  Hence, a new 
evaluation of fingerprinting method for MACSTOR KN-400 is needed. 
 
I.F. Thesis Overview 
 This thesis studies the evaluation of a gamma and neutron radiation fingerprinting 
method for spent fuel verification in MACSTOR KN-400 CANDU dry storage facility. 
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The focus of the study is to determine the sensitivity of the safeguarding system in the 
MACSTOR KN-400 spent fuel storage facility with respect to different spent fuel 
bundle diversion cases and to estimate the non-detection probability for the diversion of 
one significant quantity of plutonium and uranium. 
 Chapter 2 of this thesis elaborates on the procedures followed for estimating gamma 
and neutron radiation source term of CANDU6 spent fuel bundle and results of the 
estimations. Development of MACSTOR KN-400 radiation transport model using 
general purpose Monte Carlo code, MCNP4 for both neutron and gamma transport 
simulations is described in Chapter 3.  Chapter 4 describes about gamma radiation 
transport simulations using the MCNP model. Neutron radiation transport simulations 
and spent fuel bundle diversion cases studied are described in Chapter 5. Results of the 
transport simulations and discussions on the results are also made in Chapter 5. This 
chapter also gives the information about various kinds of spent fuel bundle diversion 
cases studied to arrive at the radiation detector sensitivities to determine the non-
detection probability. Conclusions from the study are made in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER II 
RADIATION SOURCE-TERM GENERATION FOR CANDU6 SPENT FUEL 
BUNDLE 
 
II.A. Gamma and Neutron Radiation Source-term Estimation Using Burnup Code 
 The expected emission rates of gamma and neutron radiations from the spent fuel 
stored inside the facility were estimated using ORIGEN-ARP3 burnup code. However, 
all the spent fuel bundles stored at the facility will have different material composition, 
burnups, and cooling times. Therefore, the expected gamma and neutron emission rate 
was calculated for different burnups of CANDU fuel. The source term estimations were 
performed using ORIGEN-ARP burnup code contained in the SCALE6 suit of reactor 
physics codes. 
 Source term estimations were performed for three different specific powers of 25, 
28.39 and 32 MW/tU. The burnup steps of 4, 5, 6, 7, 7.5, 8, 9, and 10 GWD/tU with a 
cooling period of 10 years was considered. The photon source strength was calculated in 
18 energy groups. The radioactivity of individual isotopes available from the ORIGEN 
output, of which 60Co, 137Cs, 154Eu, and 155Eu were considered explicitly (with their 
respective photon energies), along with ORIGEN produced 18 group photon energy 
spectrum for all isotopes. The neutron source strength was estimated for 200 energy 
groups obtained in ORIGEN-ARP burnup code. The gamma and neutron source 
strengths estimated using ORIGEN-ARP burnup code for one CANDU spent fuel bundle 
are shown in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8, respectively. The gamma and neutron energy groups and 
 14 
respective source strengths are given in Appendix A. These source terms were used in 
the radiation transport simulations of MACSTOR KN-400 described in the following 
chapters. 
 
Fig. 7: Photon spectrum for one CANDU-6 spent fuel bundle with discharge Burnup 7.5 
GWD/t Burned at Specific Power 28.39 MW/t and cooled for 10 years. 
 
 
Fig. 8: Neutron spectrum for one CANDU-6 spent fuel bundle with discharge Burnup 
7.5 GWD/t Burned at Specific Power 28.39 MW/t and cooled for 10 years. 
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II.B. Significant Quantity 
 A Significant Quantity (SQ) is the ‘approximate amount of the nuclear material for 
which possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded’11. It 
also takes into account of unavoidable losses due to conversion and manufacturing 
processes. According to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the significant 
quantity values currently in use are listed in Table I. 
 
TABLE I 
Significant quantities as defined by IAEA11 
Material Significant Quantity 
Direct use nuclear material 
Pu (containing less than 80% 238Pu) 8 kg Pu 
233U 8 kg 233U 
HEU (235U ≥ 20%) 25 kg 235U 
Indirect use nuclear material 
U(235U < 20%) 
(includes low enriched, natural and 
depleted uranium) 
75 kg 235U (for LEU) 
(or 10 t natural U or 20 t depleted U) 
Th 20 t Th 
 
 Direct use nuclear material is that which can be used for manufacture of nuclear 
explosive devices without transmutation or further enrichment. Whereas, indirect use 
nuclear material are those materials that require further enrichment or transmutation for 
use in manufacturing a nuclear explosive device. 
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 From the ORIGEN-ARP burnup calculation, the amounts of the actinides present in 
a spent fuel bundle after 10 years of cooling are estimated and are provided in Table II.  
 
TABLE II 
Amount of actinides present in a 10 years cooled spent fuel bundle 
Isotope 
Amount of Actinides in a bundle (kg) 
Before irradiation 10 years cooled spent fuel 
U234 1.06E-03 8.62E-04 
U235 1.37E-01 4.25E-02 
U236 0.00E+00 1.44E-02 
U238 1.91E+01 1.89E+01 
Np237 0.00E+00 5.51E-04 
Np239 0.00E+00 4.46E-11 
Pu239 0.00E+00 4.12E-02 
Pu240 0.00E+00 1.32E-02 
Pu241 0.00E+00 2.69E-03 
Pu242 0.00E+00 1.11E-03 
 
 From Table II, it can be observed that the amount of plutonium (Pu) present is about 
0.06 kg per bundle. Therefore, to obtain a significant quantity of plutonium (which is 8 
kg), it is required to divert at least 138 CANDU6 spent fuel bundles. Also, it is required 
to divert 1050 CANDU6 spent fuel bundles to get 1 SQ of uranium (20 t depleted 
uranium). 
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CHAPTER III 
MCNP MODELING OF MACSTOR KN-400 STORAGE FACILITY 
 
III.A. MCNP Model of a CANDU6 Fuel Bundle 
 The technical specifications of the CANDU fuel bundle used to develop the MCNP 
models were collected from ‘Nuclear Engineering Handbook’ by Kenneth D. Kok5 and 
‘CANDU6 Technical Summary’6. The particle source strength estimated using 
ORIGEN-ARP and based on the technical data from the literature for a CANDU6 spent 
fuel bundle with 37 pins, an MCNP model of a CANDU6 spent fuel bundle was 
developed. A graphic of this model is shown in Fig. 9. 
 
 
Fig. 9: 3D view of a single 37—pins CANDU 6 fuel bundle model generated by MCNP 
Visual Editor Software. 
Fuel Pins 
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III.B. MCNP Model of a Spent Fuel Storage Basket  
 The MCNP model of a spent fuel storage basket, which can hold 60 CANDU6 fuel 
bundles, is shown in Fig. 10. This was developed by expanding the MCNP model of a 
CANDU6 fuel bundle. Carbon steel with density 7.84 g/cc was used as the basket wall 
material12. The position of each fuel bundle inside the storage basket was calculated 
using the information given in Los Alamos report No. LA-UR-00-2794 on ‘Verification 
of CANDU Spent Fuel in Sealed Storage Casks’10. 
 
 
Fig. 10: 3D view of spent fuel storage basket model generated by MCNP Visual Editor 
Software. 
CANDU6 
Fuel Bundles 
Carbon Steel 
Basket Wall 
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III.C. MCNP Model of a Silo 
 The MCNP model of spent fuel storage basket was used to develop the model of a 
silo. The technical data required to develop the model are taken from the document 
‘Design Description for Re-verification System’2. A silo can hold 10 spent fuel storage 
baskets, containing 600 spent CANDU6 fuel bundles. In a silo, the spent fuel storage 
baskets are stacked as shown in Fig. 11. 
 
 
Fig. 11: 3D view of a silo model generated by MCNP Visual Editor Software. 
 
III.D. MCNP Model of the Central Structure of the MACSTOR KN-400 Facility 
 The central structure of the MACSTOR KN-400 contains four silos with the central 
re-verification tube along with carbon steel and concrete shield2. The re-verification tube 
Storage baskets in a silo 
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consists of collimators. Collimators are arrayed in a spiral manner along the height of the 
re-verification tube. Thus 40 collimators (10 in each direction) directing towards the silo 
looks at all the 40 storage baskets in four silos. MCNP model of a silo was further 
expanded to develop the central structure of the MACSTOR KN-400 as per the 
specification. The 3D view of the model generated by MCNP Visual Editor Software, 
which clearly shows the central re-verification tube, staggered 40 collimators, concrete 
shield, carbon steel shield, and four silos, is shown in Fig. 12. 
 
 
Fig. 12: 3D view of the central structure model generated by MCNP Visual Editor 
Software. 
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III.E. MCNP Model of the Peripheral Structure of the MACSTOR KN-400 Facility 
 The peripheral structure of the MACSTOR KN-400 facility contains four silos, 
facility concrete walls, and the re-verification tube running inside the module wall for 
each storage silo2. Fig. 13 is a 3D view of the model generated by MCNP Visual Editor 
Software, which clearly shows the peripheral re-verification tube, module walls, and 
four silos. 
 
 
Fig. 13: 3D view of the peripheral structure model generated by MCNP Visual Editor 
Software. 
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III.F. MCNP Modeling of Gamma and Neutron Detectors 
 In the MACSTOR KN-400 facility, the gamma and neutron profile is measured by 
lowering a detector inside the re-verification tube, which records the radiation signal at 
the level of each basket. At the top of the re-verification tube, there is a bend to prevent 
the entrance of any material unknowingly. This bend limits the size of the detector used 
for the re-verification. The maximum size of the detector that can traverse inside the re-
verification tube is 19.05 cm (length) × 3.81 cm (diameter)10. 
 The detectors used in real life measurement for gamma radiation measurements is 
cadmium zinc telluride (CZT) detector13 and for neutron measurements is helium-3 
(3He) neutron counter14. In the gamma transport simulations, the size of the CZT 
detector used was 1.5 cm × 1.5 cm × 0.75 cm. The CZT crystal is placed in an aluminum 
dioxide cask as shown in Fig. 14. 
 
 
Fig. 14: Image of CZT detector placed in line with the collimator of the re-verification 
tube 
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 For the neutron transport simulations, 3He neutrons counter with size 6.19 cm 
(length) × 1.6 cm (diameter), in which the effective length is 2.39 cm and the effective 
diameter is 1.549 cm was used. Stainless steel was used as a wall material and the 3He 
gas was kept at 2-atm pressure. The image of the neutron counter used in the simulations 
is shown in Fig. 15. 
 
 
Fig. 15: Image of neutron counter placed in line with the collimator of the re-verification 
tube 
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CHAPTER IV 
GAMMA RADIATION TRANSPORT SIMULATIONS USING MCNP 
 
 The long lived nuclides such as 60Co, 137Cs, 154Eu, and 155Eu were used as reference 
nuclides for gamma measurements. The 18 energy group gamma source strength 
estimated using the ORIGEN-ARP burnup code was divided into 140 energy groups, 
such that energy peak of each interested isotope will be in an energy group. For the 
simulation, burnup of all the spent fuel bundles contained in the MACSTOR KN-400 
storage facility were considered to be same at 7.5 GWD/tU, burned at specific power 
28.39 MW/tU and cooled for 10 years. 
 
IV.A. Diversion Analysis Using Central Structure of the MACSTOR KN-400 
Facility 
 For gamma counts measurement inside the re-verification tube, a cadmium zinc 
telluride (CZT)13 detector was placed inside the re-verification tube in line with 
collimator facing a spent fuel storage basket in a silo. The size of the CZT crystal used is 
1.5 cm x 1.5 cm x 0.75 cm, as the detector should pass through the bend and move inside 
the re-verification tube for measurement of gamma counts from all the baskets. 
 The MCNP simulations were carried out for storage basket with 60 spent fuel 
bundles in it, which was used as reference case (G-No Diversion case). Two diversion 
scenarios were considered for the diversion analysis, in the first case (G-Diversion case-
1), 9 bundles were removed including 4 bundles from peripheral region of the basket. In 
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the second case (G-Diversion case-2), the peripheral region bundles were replaced and 
the bundles from the inner region of the basket were removed. The visual representation 
of all the cases is shown in Fig. 16. 
 
 
Fig. 16: View of the models used for gamma transport simulation generated by MCNP 
Visual Editor Software. 
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 The photon spectrum obtained from the MCNP simulation of all the three cases were 
compared and is shown in Fig. 17. Photon energy peaks from 137Cs (662 keV), 154Eu 
(723, 876, 996, 1005, and 1274 keV), and 60Co (1173 and 1332 keV) can be noticed 
from the Fig. 15. From the figure, it can be observed that 137Cs energy peak (662 keV) 
gives highest response in the detector. Therefore, this region is zoomed in and shown in 
Fig. 18 for further interpretation of photon signal for the spent fuel bundle diversion 
cases analysis. 
 
 
Fig. 17: Photon spectrum in the CZT detector for all the three cases. 
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Fig. 18: Photon spectrum in CZT detector at 137Cs energy 662 keV. 
 
 From Fig. 18, it can be noticed that the photon signal at energy 662 keV is 
practically the same for no bundle diversion case (G-No Diversion case) as well as for 
the case where all the 9 spent fuel bundles were diverted from the inner region (G-
Diversion case-2) of the basket. However, spent fuel bundle diversion could be noticed 
from the 662 keV photon signal degradation (~25%) for the case where 9 bundles were 
diverted including 4 bundles from the peripheral region (G-Diversion case-1) of the 
basket. 
 
IV.B. Vertical Gamma Profile of Central Re-verification System 
 The vertical profile response of the detecting system of MACSTOR KN-400 was 
studied by modifying the MCNP models. Ten CZT detectors were placed inside the 
central re-verification tube in line with the collimators facing the spent fuel storage 
baskets in a silo as shown in Fig. 19. MCNP gamma simulation was performed by 
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starting the source particles from all the 40 spent fuel storage baskets around the central 
re-verification tube. For the diversion case, all the 60 spent fuel bundles were removed 
from one of the baskets and replaced by the dummy bundles made of depleted uranium. 
 
 
Fig. 19: MCNP Visual Editor Software generated view of the model used for vertical 
gamma profile response of the system. 
 
 Total gamma counts obtained at each detector are given in Table III. All 60 spent 
fuel bundles were removed from a basket in line with the 5th detector for diversion case. 
From Table III, it can be inferred that detector 5 in line with the diverted basket gave a 
photon signal reduction by a factor of ~100. Fig. 20 shows the variation in gamma 
counts at each detector for both the cases.  
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 TABLE III 
Gamma counts at each detector inside the central re-verification tube. 
Detectors 
Gamma counts (γ/s) 
No Diversion 
case 
% Relative 
Error 
Diversion 
case 
% Relative 
Error 
1 (Bottom) 9.17E+07 4.05 9.43E+07 1.42 
2 9.06E+07 2.55 1.00E+08 3.39 
3 9.22E+07 4.82 9.55E+07 1.88 
4 9.26E+07 8.18 1.08E+08 4.66 
5 9.53E+07 7.12 8.24E+05 14.57 
6 8.49E+07 1.04 9.74E+07 2.81 
7 8.98E+07 3.13 1.02E+08 4.39 
8 9.11E+07 4.30 1.00E+08 4.72 
9 8.99E+07 3.97 1.10E+08 6.47 
10  (Top) 8.85E+07 2.06 9.85E+07 3.47 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 20: Gamma counts at each detector inside the re-verification tube. 
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IV.C. Diversion Analysis Using Peripheral Structure of the MACSTOR KN-400 
Facility 
 For gamma counts measurement inside the peripheral re-verification tube, ten 
cadmium zinc telluride (CZT)13 detectors were placed inside the peripheral re-
verification tube. MCNP gamma simulations were performed by starting the source 
particles from the adjacent silos as shown in Fig. 21 and the particles were collected in 
all 10 detectors inside the peripheral re-verification tube. 
 
 
Fig. 21: Plan view of the model showing source particles from the adjacent silos used for 
vertical gamma profile measurement inside peripheral re-verification tube. 
 
 31 
 For the diversion case, all 60 spent fuel bundles were removed and replaced by the 
dummy bundles made of depleted uranium from one of the spent fuel storage baskets in 
a silo as shown in Fig. 22.  
 
 
Fig. 22: Axial view of the model showing the diversion of spent fuel bundles from one 
of the storage baskets. 
 
 Total gamma counts obtained at each detector were given in Table IV. All the 60 
spent fuel bundles were removed from a basket in line with the 5th detector for diversion 
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case. From Table IV, it can be inferred that the detector 5 in line with the diverted spent 
fuel storage basket gave a photon signal reduction by a factor of ~2.5. 
 
TABLE IV 
Gamma counts at each detector inside the peripheral re-verification tube 
Detectors 
Gamma counts (γ/s) 
No Diversion 
case 
% Relative 
Error 
Diversion 
case 
% Relative 
Error 
1 (Bottom) 1.89E+09 5.45 1.86E+09 5.13 
2 1.89E+09 5.05 2.70E+09 4.48 
3 1.96E+09 4.81 2.23E+09 4.75 
4 2.54E+09 4.51 2.12E+09 4.70 
5 2.81E+09 6.09 1.26E+09 5.92 
6 2.31E+09 4.95 1.54E+09 4.21 
7 2.12E+09 5.47 2.08E+09 4.82 
8 2.00E+09 4.86 2.52E+09 4.58 
9 2.58E+09 4.58 2.70E+09 4.86 
10  (Top) 2.12E+09 5.14 2.19E+09 4.72 
 
 Fig. 23 shows the variation in gamma counts at each detector inside the peripheral 
re-verification tube for both the cases. Fig. 20 and Fig. 23 shows that diversion of all the 
60 spent fuel bundles from a basket can be detected using gamma measurements.  But 
the results obtained from the gamma simulations showed that it would be difficult to 
detect the diversion of spent fuel bundles from the inner region of the basket. However, 
the gamma radiation measurement could be effective for monitoring the constant signal 
level from the spent fuel when COK is never lost. 
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Fig. 23: Gamma counts at each detector inside the peripheral re-verification tube. 
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CHAPTER V 
NEUTRON RADIATION TRANSPORT SIMULATIONS USING MCNP 
 
 For the neutron simulations, the fuel bundle with discharge burnup of 7.5 GWD/tU 
burned at a specific power of 28.39 MW/tU and cooled for 10 years was considered. The 
neutron source term estimations were completed using ORIGEN-ARP burnup code. The 
MACSTOR KN-400 MCNP model was developed by incorporating 200 energy group 
neutron source term obtained using ORIGEN-ARP burnup code. A typical 3He tube 
neutron detector14, with thermal neutron sensitivity of 0.6 cps/nv was incorporated into 
the MCNP model to get the neutron flux in the re-verification tube. 
 MCNP simulations were performed for no diversion case. The statistical errors 
associated with the obtained results were very high. Therefore, to reduce the statistical 
error in the MCNP output, the concrete shielding around the re-verification tube was 
split into three regions of varying neutron importance as shown in Fig. 24. The energy 
dependent neutron fluxes obtained at the detector inside the re-verification tube for both 
the cases are compared in Table V. 
 The variance reduction method used to reduce the statistical error produced more 
statistically converged results; therefore, this method was used in the further analysis. 
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Fig. 24: View of the models showing concrete structure with and without importance 
splitting. 
 
TABLE V 
Comparison of neutron flux and respective statistical error obtained at the detector for 
the MCNP models with neutron importance splitting and without importance splitting 
Neutron Energy 
Group (MeV) 
Neutron Flux (n/cm
2
-s) 
Without 
neutron 
importance 
splitting 
% 
Statistical 
Error 
With neutron 
importance 
splitting 
% 
Statistical 
Error 
1.0E-09 to 2.5E-08 5.91E-03 46 7.18E-03 20 
2.5E-08 to 5.0E-08 1.70E-02 28 2.66E-02 14 
5.0E-08 to 1.4E-07 6.99E-02 24 9.56E-02 10 
1.4E-07 to 4.0E-07 1.60E-01 17 1.56E-01 8 
4.0E-07 to 1.1E-06 3.11E-01 16 3.11E-01 7 
1.1E-06 to 9.1E-03 5.51E+00 6 5.06E+00 3 
9.1E-03 to 5.0E-01 5.02E+00 6 4.72E+00 4 
5.0E-01 to 2.0E+01 2.42E+00 7 2.66E+00 6 
Total 1.35E+01 4 1.30E+01 2 
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V.A. Diversion Analysis Using Central Structure of the MACSTOR KN-400 
Facility 
 For the diversion analysis, 6 diversion cases were considered along with no diversion 
case. In the diversion cases, 9 bundles in each case were removed from various regions 
of the storage basket and replaced by the dummy bundles. The diversion scenarios are: 
1. No spent fuel bundle diversion. 
2. N-Diversion case-1, where 9 bundles removed including 4 bundles from the 
peripheral region of the basket facing the collimator. 
3. N-Diversion case-2, where 9 bundles removed from the inner region of the 
basket. 
4. N-Diversion case-3, where 3 peripheral bundles were removed from each of the 3 
quadrants of the basket (total 9 bundles). 
5. N-Diversion case-4, where 3 bundles were removed from inner region of each 3 
quadrants of the basket (total 9 bundles). 
6. N-Diversion case-5, where 9 bundles were from the right-bottom quadrant of the 
basket. 
7. N-Diversion case-6, where 9 bundles were removed from the left-bottom 
quadrant, which is opposite to the collimator. 
 The images of all the diversion scenarios are given in Fig. 25. 
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Fig. 25: View of the diversion scenario models used for neutron transport simulation 
generated by MCNP Visual Editor Software. 
 
 The MCNP simulations for all the cases were carried out in two different sets: (1) 
removed spent fuel bundles were replaced by the dummy bundles made of stainless steel 
and (2) removed spent fuel bundles were replaced by the dummy bundles made of 
depleted uranium dioxide. 
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 The energy dependent neutron group fluxes obtained at the detector inside the re-
verification tube for the first set, where removed spent fuel bundles were replaced by 
stainless steel dummy bundles are given in Table VI. The statistical error obtained for all 
the cases were almost same and are tabulated in the last column of Table VI. 
 
TABLE VI 
Neutron flux estimated for diversion scenarios at detector inside re-verification tube for 
the case where removed spent fuel bundles were replaced by stainless steel dummy 
bundle. 
Neutron Energy 
Group (MeV) 
Neutron Flux (n/cm
2
-s) 
No diversion Diversion 1 Diversion 2 Diversion 3 
1.0E-09 to 2.5E-08 1.04E-2 
 
4.22E-3 8.50E-3 5.41E-3 
2.5E-08 to 5.0E-08 2.60E-2 
 
1.13E-2 2.34E-2 1.49E-2 
5.0E-08 to 1.4E-07 9.04E-2 
 
4.66E-2 6.21E-2 7.38E-2 
1.4E-07 to 4.0E-07 1.73E-1 
 
1.27E-1 1.11E-1 1.42E-1 
4.0E-07 to 1.1E-06 3.12E-1 
 
1.64E-1 2.02E-1 1.85E-1 
1.1E-06 to 9.1E-03 5.22E+0 
 
3.16E+0 3.80E+0 3.88E+0 
9.1E-03 to 5.0E-01 4.78E+0 
 
2.73E+0 3.29E+0 3.50E+0 
5.0E-01 to 2.0E+01 2.63E+0 
 
1.01E+0 1.78E+0 1.70E+0 
Total 1.32E+1 
 
7.26E+0 9.27E+0 9.52E+0 
 
Neutron Energy 
Group (MeV) 
Neutron Flux (n/cm
2
-s) 
Diversion 4 Diversion 5 Diversion 6 
% Statistical 
Error 
1.0E-09 to 2.5E-08 1.11E-2 6.49E-3 1.14E-2 19.73 
2.5E-08 to 5.0E-08 2.02E-2 1.84E-2 2.52E-2 16.85 
5.0E-08 to 1.4E-07 7.17E-2 6.76E-2 9.52E-2 10.68 
1.4E-07 to 4.0E-07 1.37E-1 1.37E-1 1.67E-1 8.76 
4.0E-07 to 1.1E-06 2.20E-1 2.80E-1 2.49E-1 6.10 
1.1E-06 to 9.1E-03 4.45E+0 4.10E+0 5.20E+0 2.44 
9.1E-03 to 5.0E-01 3.74E+0 3.91E+0 4.50E+0 2.88 
5.0E-01 to 2.0E+01 2.16E+0 2.09E+0 2.55E+0 4.25 
Total 1.08E+1 1.06E+1 1.28E+1 1.70 
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 The neutron energy dependent group fluxes for all the 6 diversion cases and no 
diversion case for first set, where removed spent fuel bundles were replaced by the 
stainless steel dummy bundles are depicted in Fig. 26. 
 
 
Fig. 26: Comparison of neutron fluxes for 6 diversion scenarios and no diversion 
scenario for the first set. 
 
 The energy dependent neutron group fluxes obtained at the detector inside the re-
verification tube for the second set, where removed spent fuel bundles were replaced by 
depleted uranium dioxide dummy bundles are given in Table VII. The statistical errors 
obtained are tabulated in the last column of Table. 
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TABLE VII 
Neutron flux estimated for diversion scenarios at detector inside re-verification tube for 
the case where removed spent fuel bundles were replaced by depleted uranium dioxide 
dummy bundle. 
Neutron Energy 
Group (MeV) 
Neutron Flux (n/cm
2
-s) 
No diversion Diversion 1 Diversion 2 Diversion 3 
1.0E-09 to 2.5E-08 1.04E-2 
 
4.78E-3 6.99E-3 7.51E-3 
2.5E-08 to 5.0E-08 2.60E-2 
 
1.20E-2 2.00E-2 1.67E-2 
5.0E-08 to 1.4E-07 9.04E-2 
 
5.22E-2 6.68E-2 6.32E-2 
1.4E-07 to 4.0E-07 1.73E-1 
 
9.35E-2 1.28E-1 1.20E-1 
4.0E-07 to 1.1E-06 3.12E-1 
 
1.62E-1 1.89E-1 1.96E-1 
1.1E-06 to 9.1E-03 5.22E+0 
 
2.99E+0 3.77E+0 3.82E+0 
9.1E-03 to 5.0E-01 4.78E+0 
 
2.62E+0 3.31E+0 3.54E+0 
5.0E-01 to 2.0E+01 2.63E+0 
 
1.07E+0 1.89E+0 1.71E+0 
Total 1.32E+1 
 
7.00E+0 9.35E+0 9.44E+0 
 
Neutron Energy 
Group (MeV) 
Neutron Flux (n/cm
2
-s) 
Diversion 4 Diversion 5 Diversion 6 
% Statistical 
Error 
1.0E-09 to 2.5E-08 9.86E-3 4.69E-3 8.47E-3 17.28 
2.5E-08 to 5.0E-08 1.85E-2 1.84E-2 2.64E-2 19.78 
5.0E-08 to 1.4E-07 7.41E-2 6.40E-2 9.44E-2 12.31 
1.4E-07 to 4.0E-07 1.50E-1 1.36E-1 1.72E-1 10.57 
4.0E-07 to 1.1E-06 2.38E-1 2.80E-1 2.48E-1 6.84 
1.1E-06 to 9.1E-03 4.31E+0 4.16E+0 5.19E+0 2.77 
9.1E-03 to 5.0E-01 3.89E+0 3.88E+0 4.43E+0 3.23 
5.0E-01 to 2.0E+01 2.23E+0 2.12E+0 2.54E+0 4.81 
Total 1.10E+1 1.06E+1 1.28E+1 1.92 
 
 
 
 The neutron energy dependent group fluxes for all the 6 diversion scenario cases 
and no diversion case for first set, where removed spent fuel bundles were replaced by 
the depleted uranium dioxide dummy bundles are depicted in Fig. 27. 
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Fig. 27: Comparison of neutron fluxes for 6 diversion scenarios and no diversion 
scenario for the second set. 
 
 From Tables VI and VII, it can be observed that most neutron signal reduction is 
observed for diversion case-1 (by a factor of 2). If the neutron signal reductions are 
ordered from most to least, the pattern will be diversion case 1, 2, 3, 5, 4, 6. Diversion 
case 6 has the very low signal difference (practically no difference) compared to the no 
diversion case.   
 From Tables VI and VII and the pictorial representations, it can be observed that the 
neutron flux obtained was dominated by fast neutrons, but the 3He detector used inside 
the re-verification tube is highly responsive to thermal neutrons than fast neutrons. The 
energy of the fast neutrons can be reduced by slowing it down by using the thermalizing 
material between the detector and spent fuel basket. Therefore, MCNP models were 
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modified to thermalize the fast neutrons by adding 2 inch thick thermalizing material 
inside the collimator. SWX-213 (Pure Polyethylene)15 was used as the thermalizing 
material with the material density 0.92 g/cc. MCNP simulations were carried out in two 
steps: (1) 2-inch polyethylene inside the collimator at the detector end, and (2) 2-inch 
polyethylene inside the collimator at the basket end. Images of the two models are 
shown in Fig. 28. 
 
 
Fig. 28: Images showing the position of polyethylene inside the collimator 
 
 The comparison of energy dependent neutron group fluxes obtained at the detector 
inside the re-verification tube for the cases where, no polyethylene inside the collimator, 
2” polyethylene inside the collimator at detector end, and 2” polyethylene inside the 
collimator at basket end are given in Table VIII. 
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TABLE VIII 
Neutron flux estimated at the detector inside re-verification tube for no diversion case. 
 
 Fig. 29 schematically shows the variation of neutron flux with respect to neutron 
energy for all the above mentioned cases. 
 
 
Fig. 29: Schematic representation of neutron flux variation for the cases with and 
without polyethylene inside the collimator. 
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Neutron Energy 
Group (MeV) 
Neutron Flux (n/cm
2
-s) 
No 
polyethy
-lene 
% 
Statist
-ical 
Error 
Polyeth-
ylene at 
detector 
end 
% 
Statistic
-al 
Error 
Polyethy
-lene at 
basket 
end 
% 
Statistic
-al 
Error 
1.0E-9 to 2.5E-8 6.59E-02 
 
22.03 4.32E-01 2.96 6.67E-02 9.71 
2.5E-8 to 5.0E-8 1.91E-01 
 
12.53 8.88E-01 2.12 1.63E-01 5.80 
5.0E-8 to 1.4E-7 5.69E-01 
 
7.05 1.82E+0
0 
1.55 5.89E-01 3.18 
1.4E-7 to 4.0E-7 1.18E+00 
 
5.14 1.46E+0
0 
1.70 1.16E+00 2.45 
4.0E-7 to 1.1E-6 2.21E+00 
 
4.19 2.05E+0
0 
1.50 2.09E+00 1.86 
1.1E-6 to 9.1E-3 3.87E+01 
 
1.61 3.04E+0
1 
0.56 3.66E+01 0.68 
9.1E-3 to 5.0E-1 2.81E+01 
 
2.18 2.17E+0
1 
0.74 2.59E+01 0.87 
5.0E-1 to 2.0E+1 9.62E+00 
 
4.11 6.94E+0
0 
1.34 8.13E+00 1.67 
Total 8.06E+01 
 
1.24 6.57E+0
1 
0.42 7.47E+01 0.50 
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 From Table VIII and Fig. 29, it can be observed that better neutron fluxes in thermal 
region were obtained for the MCNP simulation in the case where 2” polyethylene inside 
the collimator at detector end than no polyethylene case and 2” polyethylene inside the 
collimator at basket end case. Therefore, all the further MCNP neutron simulations were 
performed using the model with 2” polyethylene inside the collimator at detector end.  
 N-Diversion case-6 (refer Fig. 25), where 9 spent fuel bundles were removed from 
the left-bottom quadrant, which gave very low signal difference (practically no 
difference) compared to the no diversion case was considered to check the effect of 
polyethylene inclusion. The MCNP simulations were carried out for two cases; (1) 
removed spent fuel bundles were replaced by stainless steel dummy bundles, and (2) 
removed spent fuel bundles were replaced by depleted uranium dioxide dummy bundles 
as shown in Fig. 30. 
 
 
Fig. 30: MCNP models used to check the effect of inclusion of polyethylene inside the 
collimator. 
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 The comparison of the energy dependent neutron group fluxes obtained at the 
detector inside the re-verification tube for no diversion case and diversion cases (N-
Diversion case-6) with dummy bundles replacement are given in Table IX. 
 
TABLE IX 
Neutron flux estimated at the detector inside re-verification tube for no diversion case 
and diversion cases. 
 
 Fig. 31 shown below schematically represents the neutron flux variation with respect 
to neutron energy for no diversion case, diversion case with stainless steel dummy 
bundles replacement, and diversion case with dummy depleted uranium dioxide bundles 
replacement. 
Neutron 
Energy Group 
(MeV) 
Neutron Flux (n/cm
2
-s) 
No 
Diversion 
% 
Statistic
-al 
Error 
Stainless 
steel 
bundle 
replace-
ment 
% 
Statistic
-al 
Error 
Depleted 
uranium 
bundle 
replace-
ment 
% 
Statistic-
al Error 
1.0E-9 to 2.5E-8 4.32E-01 2.96 4.33E-01 3.59 4.34E-01 3.59 
2.5E-8 to 5.0E-8 8.88E-01 2.12 8.78E-01 2.65 8.78E-01 2.65 
5.0E-8 to 1.4E-7 1.82E+00 1.55 1.79E+0
0 
1.93 1.78E+0
0 
1.93 
1.4E-7 to 4.0E-7 1.46E+00 1.70 1.45E+0
0 
2.23 1.45E+0
0 
2.23 
4.0E-7 to 1.1E-6 2.05E+00 1.50 2.04E+0
0 
1.98 2.04E+0
0 
1.97 
1.1E-6 to 9.1E-3 3.04E+01 0.56 3.01E+0
1 
0.72 3.01E+0
1 
0.72 
9.1E-3 to 5.0E-1 2.17E+01 0.74 2.16E+0
1 
0.91 2.16E+0
1 
0.91 
5.0E-1 to 
2.0E+1 
6.94E+00 1.34 6.81E+0
0 
1.66 6.82E+0
0 
1.66 
Total 6.57E+01 0.42 6.51E+0
1 
0.52 6.51E+0
1 
0.52 
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Fig. 31: Schematic representation of variation of neutron flux for no diversion case and 
diversion cases with dummy stainless steel and depleted uranium dioxide bundles 
replacement. 
 
 From the Fig. 31 and Table IX, it can be inferred that the change in neutron fluxes 
between no diversion case and diversion cases (9 spent fuel bundles from the region 
opposite to the collimator) (refer Fig. 30) is very small (practically no difference).  
 The obtained flux at the 3He detector inside the re-verification tube was converted to 
3He(n,p)3H reaction rates. The calculated reaction rates are given in Table X. Results 
shown in Table X also suggest that there is no significant difference in reaction rates 
between no diversion case and diversion cases. 
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TABLE X 
3He(n,p)3H reaction rates at the detector inside re-verification tube. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V.B. Sensitivity of the Detection System with respect to the Removal of the Spent 
Fuel Bundles from the Basket 
 MCNP models were developed to determine the sensitivity of the detection system 
with respect to the removal of the spent fuel bundles from the basket and replacing it by 
dummy bundles made of depleted uranium dioxide bundles. Eight additional diversion 
cases were considered along with no diversion case, where in each case 3 additional 
spent fuel bundles were removed and replaced by the dummy depleted uranium dioxide 
bundles. Fig. 32 shows the images of the models used to determine the sensitivity of the 
detection system with respect to the removal of spent fuel bundles. 
Diversion Case 
3
He(n,p)
3
H reaction rate (per 
second) in 
3
He tube 
No Diversion 18.0 
9 bundles diversion with DU 
replacement 
 
17.8 
9 bundles diversion with SS 
replacement 
17.8 
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Fig. 32: Images of the models used to determine the sensitivity of the detection system 
with respect to the removal of spent fuel bundles. 
 
 The comparison of energy dependent neutron group fluxes obtained at the detector 
inside the re-verification tube for the no diversion case and other 8 diversion cases with 
2” polyethylene inside the collimator at detector end are given in Table XI. The MCNP 
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estimated percent error for all the cases were almost same and are given in last column 
of Table XI. 
 
TABLE XI 
Neutron flux estimated at the detector inside re-verification tube for no diversion case 
and 8 various diversion cases with 2-inch polyethylene at detector end inside the 
collimator. 
 
Neutron Energy 
Group (MeV) 
Neutron Flux (n/cm
2
-s) 
No 
Diversion 
N-
Diversion 
case-S1 
N-
Diversion 
case-S2 
N-
Diversion 
case-S3 
N-
Diversion 
case-S4 
1.0E-9 to 2.5E-8 4.32E-1 4.34E-1 4.24E-1 4.23E-1 4.49E-1 
2.5E-8 to 5.0E-8 8.88E-1 8.78E-1 8.71E-1 8.33E-1 8.57E-1 
5.0E-8 to 1.4E-7 1.82E+0 1.78E+0 1.81E+0 1.77E+0 1.86E+0 
1.4E-7 to 4.0E-7 1.46E+0 1.45E+0 1.48E+0 1.43E+0 1.41E+0 
4.0E-7 to 1.1E-6 2.05E+0 2.04E+0 2.00E+0 1.99E+0 2.04E+0 
1.1E-6 to 9.1E-3 3.04E+1 3.01E+1 3.03E+1 3.05E+1 3.06E+1 
9.1E-3 to 5.0E-1 2.17E+1 2.16E+1 2.20E+1 2.17E+1 2.18E+1 
5.0E-1 to 2.0E+1 6.94E+0 6.82E+0 6.75E+0 7.09E+0 6.93E+0 
Total 6.57E+1 6.51E+1 6.56E+1 6.57E+1 6.60E+1 
 
Neutron Energy 
Group (MeV) 
Neutron Flux (n/cm
2
-s) 
N-
Diversion 
case-S5 
N-
Diversion 
case-S6 
N-
Diversion 
case-S7 
N-
Diversion 
case-S8 
% 
Statistical 
Error 
1.0E-9 to 2.5E-8 4.10E-1 4.47E-1 4.26E-1 4.41E-1 3.57 
2.5E-8 to 5.0E-8 8.51E-1 8.55E-1 9.26E-1 8.49E-1 2.65 
5.0E-8 to 1.4E-7 1.76E+0 1.75E+0 1.79E+0 1.82E+0 1.93 
1.4E-7 to 4.0E-7 1.40E+0 1.38E+0 1.50E+0 1.45E+0 2.18 
4.0E-7 to 1.1E-6 1.97E+0 1.92E+0 2.06E+0 2.03E+0 1.98 
1.1E-6 to 9.1E-3 3.02E+1 3.00E+1 3.01E+1 3.01E+1 0.72 
9.1E-3 to 5.0E-1 2.15E+1 2.14E+1 2.14E+1 2.13E+1 0.92 
5.0E-1 to 2.0E+1 6.69E+0 6.93E+0 6.85E+0 6.89E+0 1.68 
Total 6.48E+1 6.46E+1 6.50E+1 6.49E+1 0.52 
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 The variation neutron fluxes with respect to neutron energy are schematically shown 
in Fig. 33. 
 
 
Fig. 33: Schematic representation of variation of neutron flux for no diversion case and 8 
various diversion cases used to determine the sensitivity of the detection system. 
 
 The 3He reaction rate was estimated by MCNP simulation for no diversion case and 
different diversion scenarios. The comparison of the 3He reaction rate inside the detector 
for all the cases is given in Table XII. 
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TABLE XII 
3He reaction rate for no diversion case and different diversion cases. 
Case Scenario Reaction rate (Rxn/s) 
No Diversion No Diversion 17.97 
N-Diversion case-S1 
9 Bundles removed & replaced by 
depleted U bundles 
17.76 
N-Diversion case-S2 
12 Bundles removed & replaced 
by depleted U bundles 
17.73 
N-Diversion case-S3 
15 Bundles removed & replaced 
by depleted U bundles 
17.62 
N-Diversion case-S4 
18 Bundles removed & replaced 
by depleted U bundles 
17.95 
N-Diversion case-S5 
21 Bundles removed & replaced 
by depleted U bundles 
17.38 
N-Diversion case-S6 
24 Bundles removed & replaced 
by depleted U bundles 
17.47 
N-Diversion case-S7 
27 Bundles removed & replaced 
by depleted U bundles 
17.94 
N-Diversion case-S8 
30 Bundles removed & replaced 
by depleted U bundles 
17.84 
 
 From the Tables XI and XII and Fig. 30, it can be inferred that there is no significant 
neutron signal reduction even when 30 spent fuel bundles are removed from a basket 
region on the opposite side of the collimator (refer image in Fig. 32). 
 
V.C. Inverse MCNP model 
 An inverse MCNP model was developed to determine which of the bundles in the 
basket were contributing to the total neutron flux obtained in the detector. In this model, 
neutrons were generated at the position of 3He detector inside the re-verification tube in 
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line with the collimator and spent fuel storage basket. The transported neutrons were 
collected at the 60 positions inside the spent fuel storage basket, which are the positions 
of 60 fuel bundles inside the storage basket. 
 
 
Fig. 34: Neutron flux at 60 different positions in the inverse model. 
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 This model gave a better understanding of the scenario, from this inverse simulation, 
it is inferred that the neutron flux contribution from almost 40 spent fuel bundles in the 
region of the basket which is opposite to detector was relatively small (negligible), as 
shown in Fig. 34. Numbers shown in the Fig. 34 on each bundle are total neutron flux 
(n/cm2-s) at that position. 
 From this observation, it can be concluded that it will be very difficult to determine 
the diversion of about 40 spent fuel bundles (~67% of bundles in a basket) from the 
storage basket region opposite to the collimator and re-verification tube. 
 
V.D. Vertical Neutron Profile 
 The vertical neutron profile response of the detecting system of the MACSTOR KN-
400 was studied by modifying the MCNP models. Ten 3He detectors were placed inside 
the central re-verification tube in line with the collimators facing the spent fuel storage 
baskets in a silo (refer Fig. 19). MCNP neutron simulation was performed by starting the 
source particles from all the spent fuel bundles in 40 storage baskets around the central 
re-verification tube. For the diversion case, all 60 spent fuel bundles were removed from 
one of the baskets and replaced by the dummy bundles made of depleted uranium. 
 The comparison of the total, thermal and fast neutron fluxes obtained at each 
detector inside the re-verification tube for no diversion case is given in Table XIII and 
for diversion case is given in Table XIV. The variation of total neutron flux with respect 
to detectors from bottom to top for both no diversion and diversion case is schematically 
shown in Fig. 35.  
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TABLE XIII 
Comparison of neutron fluxes at each detector inside the re-verification tube for no 
diversion case. 
Detector 
Neutron Flux (n/cm
2
-s) 
No Diversion Case 
Thermal Fast Total 
% Statistical 
Error 
1 (Bottom) 1.11E+00 1.15E+01 1.26E+01 1.21 
2 1.49E+00 1.53E+01 1.68E+01 1.01 
3 1.53E+00 1.62E+01 1.78E+01 0.99 
4 1.56E+00 1.60E+01 1.76E+01 0.96 
5 1.60E+00 1.61E+01 1.77E+01 1.02 
6 1.54E+00 1.59E+01 1.75E+01 0.98 
7 1.61E+00 1.62E+01 1.79E+01 0.99 
8 1.58E+00 1.61E+01 1.76E+01 0.98 
9 1.56E+00 1.56E+01 1.72E+01 1.13 
10 (top) 1.23E+00 1.27E+01 1.39E+01 1.13 
 
 
  
Fig. 35: Schematic representation of the variation of total neutron flux collected at all 10 
detectors inside central re-verification tube. 
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TABLE XIV 
Comparison of neutron fluxes at each detector inside the re-verification tube for 
diversion case. 
Detector 
Neutron Flux (n/cm
2
-s) 
Diversion Case 
Thermal Fast Total 
% Statistical 
Error 
1 (Bottom) 1.09E+00 1.14E+01 1.25E+01 1.17 
2 1.46E+00 1.49E+01 1.64E+01 0.99 
3 1.49E+00 1.49E+01 1.64E+01 0.98 
4 1.23E+00 1.31E+01 1.43E+01 1.09 
5 1.01E+00 9.96E+00 1.10E+01 1.19 
6 1.20E+00 1.25E+01 1.37E+01 1.07 
7 1.42E+00 1.51E+01 1.65E+01 0.98 
8 1.54E+00 1.56E+01 1.71E+01 0.95 
9 1.43E+00 1.51E+01 1.65E+01 0.98 
10 (top) 1.23E+00 1.24E+01 1.36E+01 1.08 
 
 All 60 spent fuel bundles were removed from a storage basket in line with the 5th 
detector for the diversion case. From the Tables XIII, XIV and Fig. 35, it can be inferred 
that the 5th detector in line with the diverted basket gave a total neutron signal reduction 
by a factor of ~1.2. 
 
V.E. Diversion Analysis Using Peripheral Structure of the MACSTOR KN-400 
Facility 
 For the diversion analysis using the peripheral structure of the MACSTOR KN-400 
facility, ten 3He detectors were placed inside the peripheral re-verification tube in line 
with each spent fuel storage basket in a silo. MCNP neutron simulations were performed 
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by starting the source particles from the adjacent silos (refer Fig. 22) and the particles 
were collected in all 10 detectors inside the peripheral re-verification tube. 
 For the diversion case, all 60 spent fuel bundles were removed and replaced by the 
depleted uranium dioxide dummy bundles from one of the spent fuel storage baskets in a 
silo (refer Fig. 22). 
 The comparison of the total, thermal and fast neutron fluxes obtained at each 
detector inside the peripheral re-verification tube for all cases are provided in Table XV. 
The variation of total neutron flux with respect to detectors from bottom to top for both 
no diversion and diversion case is schematically shown in Fig. 36. 
 
TABLE XV 
Comparison of neutron fluxes for no diversion and diversion case for peripheral 
structure 
Detector 
Neutron Flux (n/cm
2
-s) 
No Diversion Case Diversion Case  
Total Thermal Fast Total Thermal Fast 
1 (Bottom) 3.21E+2 4.96E+0 3.16E+2 3.14E+2 4.61E+0 3.10E+2 
2 4.84E+2 7.67E+0 4.77E+2 4.69E+2 7.44E+0 4.61E+2 
3 5.47E+2 9.03E+0 5.38E+2 5.12E+2 8.42E+0 5.04E+2 
4 5.76E+2 9.59E+0 5.66E+2 4.77E+2 8.11E+0 4.69E+2 
5 5.88E+2 9.66E+0 5.79E+2 4.17E+2 7.34E+0 4.10E+2 
6 5.91E+2 9.77E+0 5.82E+2 4.83E+2 8.07E+0 4.75E+2 
7 5.78E+2 9.45E+0 5.69E+2 5.41E+2 8.76E+0 5.32E+2 
8 5.51E+2 9.09E+0 5.42E+2 5.36E+2 8.95E+0 5.28E+2 
9 4.82E+2 7.97E+0 4.74E+2 4.77E+2 7.80E+0 4.70E+2 
10 (Top) 3.27E+2 4.97E+0 3.22E+2 3.24E+2 5.16E+0 3.19E+2 
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Fig. 36: Schematic representation of variation of total neutron flux collected at all 10 
detectors inside peripheral re-verification tube. 
 
TABLE XVI 
3He reaction rate in all 10 detectors inside the peripheral re-verification tube for both no 
diversion and diversion case. 
Detector 
3
He Reaction rate (Rxn/s) 
No Diversion case Diversion Case 
1 (Bottom) 34.5 33.0 
2 53.7 52.1 
3 62.3 57.7 
4 66.8 56.2 
5 68.2 51.7 
6 69.3 57.0 
7 66.3 62.1 
8 63.6 61.5 
9 54.5 53.4 
10 (Top) 35.1 35.6 
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 The 3He reaction rate was also estimated by the MCNP simulation and the obtained 
results are given in Table XVI. All 60 spent fuel bundles were removed from a storage 
basket in line with the 5th detector for diversion cases. From the Fig. 36, Tables XV and 
XVI, it can be observed that the detector 5 in line with the diverted spent fuel storage 
basket gave a total neutron signal reduction by a factor of ~1.5. 
 
V.F. Non-Detection Probability 
 From the previous calculations (refer Chapter 2), it is required to divert ~140 spent 
fuel bundles from the facility to get 1 SQ of Pu. The MCNP model was developed to 
estimate the non-detection probability for the neutron measurement. In the model, 14 
spent fuel bundles from each of the baskets in a silo, which sum up to 140 spent fuel 
bundles (1 SQ of Pu material) was removed and replaced by depleted uranium dioxide as 
shown in Fig. 37. 
 
 
Fig. 37: Views of the model showing the replaced 14 dummy depleted uranium dioxide 
bundles in each of the baskets in a silo 
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 Ten 3He detectors were placed inside the re-verification tube in line with the 
collimators facing the storage baskets in a silo. The obtained total neutron fluxes in each 
detector for no diversion and diversion case are tabulated in Table XVII and Table 
XVIII respectively. The pictorial representation of the variation of the total neutron flux 
for both the cases is shown in Fig. 38. 
 
TABLE XVII 
Neutron flux obtained for no diversion case used to estimate non-detection probability 
Detector 
Neutron Flux (n/cm
2
-s) 
Thermal Fast Total 
% Statistical 
Error 
1 (Bottom) 3.17E+00 4.13E+01 4.45E+01 1.94 
2 4.21E+00 5.65E+01 6.07E+01 1.83 
3 4.03E+00 5.76E+01 6.16E+01 1.82 
4 4.50E+00 6.03E+01 6.48E+01 1.82 
5 4.47E+00 5.96E+01 6.41E+01 1.80 
6 4.60E+00 5.91E+01 6.37E+01 2.15 
7 4.65E+00 6.10E+01 6.56E+01 1.91 
8 4.77E+00 5.97E+01 6.45E+01 1.93 
9 4.23E+00 5.70E+01 6.12E+01 1.89 
10 (Top) 3.35E+00 4.54E+01 4.87E+01 2.24 
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TABLE XVIII 
Neutron flux obtained for diversion case used to estimate non-detection probability 
Detector 
Neutron Flux (n/cm
2
-s) 
Thermal Fast Total 
% Statistical 
Error 
1 (Bottom) 3.07E+00 4.23E+01 4.54E+01 1.49 
2 3.94E+00 5.41E+01 5.81E+01 1.41 
3 4.54E+00 5.83E+01 6.28E+01 1.42 
4 4.42E+00 5.91E+01 6.35E+01 1.43 
5 4.51E+00 5.98E+01 6.43E+01 1.44 
6 4.64E+00 5.86E+01 6.33E+01 1.66 
7 4.54E+00 5.87E+01 6.33E+01 1.42 
8 4.20E+00 5.70E+01 6.12E+01 1.44 
9 4.17E+00 5.67E+01 6.08E+01 1.45 
10 (top) 3.29E+00 4.49E+01 4.82E+01 1.72 
 
 
Fig. 38: Variation of total neutron flux for no diversion and diversion case used to 
estimate the non-detection probability 
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 From Tables XVII, XVIII and Fig. 38, it can be observed that there is very small 
signal difference (practically no signal difference) between no diversion case and 
diversion. The non-detection probability calculated using the obtained data was almost 
equal to 1. By this simulation, it can be concluded that 1 SQ of Pu (140 spent fuel 
bundles) material can be easily diverted if the diverting state or organization is smart 
enough to divert 14 spent fuel bundles from each of the baskets in a silo, from the basket 
region opposite to the collimator of the re-verification tube. This confirms that the non-
detection probability of the current detection system is 1 for specific cases as observed 
by the simulations.  
 Similar MCNP simulations were performed to estimate the non-detection probability 
of the current detection system with respect to the diversion of spent fuel bundles from 
the storage baskets in a silo. In this simulation, eight scenarios were considered; in each 
scenario spent fuel bundles from an additional basket were diverted, such that, in each 
case ~140 spent fuel bundles were diverted from a silo. By using the simulation results, 
non-detection probability (βtot) and detection probability (PD) of the detection system for 
each case were estimated. The scheme of the diversions and the results obtained are 
given in Table XIX. 
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TABLE XIX 
 Scheme of diversions, non-detection and detection probability. 
Baskets 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
No. of 
bundles 
β 
No. of 
bundles 
β 
No. of 
bundles 
β 
No. of 
bundles 
β 
1 60 0.001 35 0.897 28 0.957 24 0.969 
2 60 0.001 35 0.897 28 0.957 24 0.969 
3 21 0.982 35 0.897 28 0.957 24 0.969 
4   
35 0.897 28 0.957 24 0.969 
5 
    
28 0.957 24 0.969 
6       
24 0.969 
βtot  
0.000 
 
0.646 
 
0.803 
 
0.830 
PD  
1.000 
 
0.354 
 
0.197 
 
0.170 
 
Baskets 
Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 
No. of 
bundles 
β 
No. of 
bundles 
β 
No. of 
bundles 
β 
No. of 
bundles 
β 
1 20 0.982 17 0.988 16 0.990 14 0.991 
2 20 0.982 17 0.988 16 0.990 14 0.991 
3 20 0.982 17 0.988 16 0.990 14 0.991 
4 20 0.982 17 0.988 16 0.990 14 0.991 
5 20 0.982 18 0.988 16 0.990 14 0.991 
6 20 0.982 18 0.988 15 0.990 14 0.991 
7 20 0.982 18 0.988 15 0.990 14 0.991 
8   
18 0.988 15 0.990 14 0.991 
9 
    
15 0.990 14 0.991 
10       
14 0.991 
βtot  
0.882 
 
0.905 
 
0.914 
 
0.915 
PD  
0.118 
 
0.095 
 
0.086 
 
0.085 
 
 The results obtained for non-detection probability is pictorially shown in Fig. 39. 
The detection probability of the detection system is pictorially shown in Fig. 40. 
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Fig. 39: Non-detection probability of the detection system with respect to diversion from 
the storage baskets. 
 
 
Fig. 40: Detection probability of the detection system with respect to diversion from the 
storage baskets. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 This study focused on the evaluation of the gamma and neutron fingerprinting 
method for spent fuel verification in the MACSTOR KN-400 CANDU dry storage 
facility. The gamma and neutron source strength of CANDU6 spent fuel was estimated 
using ORIGEN-ARP burnup code. An MCNP model of a 37-fuel pins CANDU6 fuel 
bundle was developed. The MCNP model was further expanded to develop a spent fuel 
storage basket containing 60 spent fuel bundles. An MCNP model of a silo, which can 
hold up to 10 spent fuel storage baskets, was developed. The MCNP model of the central 
structure of the MACSTOR KN-400 facility, which contains four silos with the central 
re-verification tube along with carbon steel and high density concrete shield, was 
developed. The MCNP model of the peripheral structure of the MACSTOR KN-400 
facility, which contains peripheral re-verification tube running through the module wall 
for a silo, was also developed. 
 MCNP gamma and neutron simulations were performed using both central and 
peripheral structure of MACSTOR KN-400. CZT and 3He detectors were placed inside 
the re-verification tube in line with the spent fuel storage basket to measure the gamma 
and neutron flux respectively. The sensitivity of the measurement system was tested by 
considering various diversion scenarios. In the diversion cases, the spent fuel bundles 
from the storage basket were replaced by stainless steel or depleted uranium dioxide 
dummy bundles.  
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 Gamma transport simulation studies suggested that the detection of spent fuel 
diversion is difficult if only the gamma signals at the re-verification tube are considered. 
This is because the gamma signals reaching the detector inside the re-verification tube 
are essentially from the spent fuel bundles that are stored in the peripheral region of the 
basket which faces the collimator of the re-verification tube. So, if the diversion occurs 
from the internal regions of the basket, the gamma signal decrease cannot be measured 
and it will be very difficult to detect spent fuel bundles diversion. However, the vertical 
profile of the gamma radiation showed that it could be effective in monitoring the 
constant signal level from the spent fuel when COK is not lost. 
 Neutron transport simulation studies suggests that there are changes in neutron 
signals, especially the fast neutron signals reaching the detector inside the re-verification 
tube when the spent fuel bundles are removed from the region of the storage basket 
facing the collimator of the re-verification tube. Also, it is found from the neutron 
transport simulations that the probability of detection of diversion of about 40 spent fuel 
bundles from the basket region opposite (which is not seeing the collimator of the re-
verification tube) to the collimator is very low. Diversion of any of these 40 spent fuel 
bundles is difficult to detect.  However, it should be noted here that to obtain 1 SQ of 
plutonium at least 138 spent fuel bundles are required to be diverted. Therefore, an 
adversary could attempt to divert 47 spent fuel bundles from each of the three baskets to 
acquire 1 SQ. This kind of diversion reduces the neutron signal significantly at the 
detector. The probability of detecting this diversion is almost equal to 1. 
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 By introducing thermalizing material between the detector and the spent fuel storage 
basket the sensitivity of the detection system to the diversion of the spent fuel bundles 
from the storage basket is improved by a factor of 3. 
 Non-detection probability for removing ~140 spent fuel bundles as a function of 
number of baskets is also determined. In the worst scenario, the diverting state or 
organization could divert 14 spent fuel bundles from each of 10 baskets in a silo from 
the basket region opposite to the collimator of the re-verification tube. The non-detection 
probability for this scenario is close to 1. This diversion cannot be easily detected using 
the currently designed detection system. In order to increase the detection probability, 
either the design of the facility must be changed or other safeguard methods, such as 
containment and surveillance methods must be used for safeguarding the nuclear 
material at the facility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 67 
REFERENCES 
1. S. S. PARK, J. S. SHIN, and J. K. YEO, “Safeguards Approach to the 
MACSTOR KN-400 Type Dry Storage at the Wolsung Facility,” A report by 
Korea Institute of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control (2006). 
2. C. JAMES, M. GAMIL, and C SANDRA, “Design Description for 
Reverification System,” KN-N-AE-D-G-001, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power 
Co., Ltd (Dec. 2006). 
3. I.C. GAULD, S.M. BOWMAN, and J.E. HORWEDEL, “ORIGEN-ARP: 
Automatic Rapid Processing for Spent Fuel Depletion, Decay, and Source Term 
Analysis,” ORNL/TM-2005/39, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Jan. 2009). 
4. X-5 MONTE CARLO TEAM, “MCNP - A General Monte Carlo N-Particle 
Transport Code,” Version 5, Vol. 1 & 2, Los Alamos National Laboratory (April 
2003). 
5. K. D. KOK, Nuclear Engineering Handbook, CRC Press (June 2009). 
6. CANDU6 PROGRAM TEAM, “CANDU6 Technical Summary,” Reactor 
Development Business Unit, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) (June 
2005); available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/39973366/C6-Technical-
Summary. 
 
 
 
 68 
7. M. BUNN, J. P. HOLDREN, A. MACFARLANE, S. E. PICKETT, A. SUZUKI, 
T. SUZUKI and J. WEEKS, “Interim Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel: A Safe, 
Flexible, and Cost-Effective Near-Term Approach to Spent Fuel Management,” 
Harvard University and University of Tokyo (June 2001); available at 
http://www.whrc.org/resources/publications/pdf/BunnetalHarvardTokyo.01.pdf 
8. NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT DIVISION ONTARIO POWER 
GENERATION INC., “Nuclear Waste Management: Technical Support 
Document,” New Nuclear-Darlington Environmental Assessment (Aug. 2009); 
available at 
http://www.ceaa.gc.ca/050/documents_staticpost/cearref_29525/0104/nwm.pdf 
9. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, “Good Practices in Heavy 
Water Reactor Operation,” IAEA-TECDOC-1650,  International Atomic Energy 
Agency, Vienna (2010); available at http://www-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_1650_web.pdf 
10. K. D. VEAL, M. E. ABHOLD, and H. O. MENLOVE, “Verification of CANDU 
Spent Fuel in Sealed Storage Casks,” LA-UR-00-2794, Los Alomos National 
Laboratory (July 2000). 
11. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, “IAEA Safeguards 
Glossary, International Nuclear Verification Series No. 3,” IAEA/NVS/3, 
International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (2002); available at http://www-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/nvs-3-cd/PDF/NVS3_prn.pdf 
 69 
12. A. B. CHILTON, J. K. SHULTIS, and R. E. FAW, Principles of Radiation 
Shielding, Prentice-Hall (1984). 
13. C. GRUPEN and I. BUVAT (eds.), Handbook of Particle Detection and 
Imaging, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-13271-1_1, © Springer-Verlag Berlin 
Heidelberg (2012). 
14. LND, INC., “Cylindrical He3 Neutron Detector”; available at 
http://lndinc.com/products/536/. (Last accessed: April 2012) 
15. R. G. WILLIAMS III, C. J. GESH, R. T. PAGH, “Compendium of Material 
Composition Data for Radiation Transport Modeling,” PNNL-15870, Pacific 
Northwest National Laboratory (April 2006); available at 
http://www.pnl.gov/main/publications/external/technical_reports/PNNL-
15870.pdf 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 70 
APPENDIX A 
Table XX: Gamma energy group and respective source strength. 
Energy 
(MeV) 
Photon 
Source 
Strength 
(γ/s) 
Energy 
(MeV) 
Photon 
Source 
Strength 
(γ /s) 
Energy 
(MeV) 
Photon 
Source 
Strength 
(γ /s) 
Energy 
(MeV) 
Photon 
Source 
Strength 
(γ /s) 
0.00E+00 0.00E+00 6.82E-02 7.01E+10 5.58E-01 5.12E+08 7.95E-01 4.72E+09 
9.00E-04 0.00E+00 7.00E-02 1.02E+11 5.63E-01 3.59E+10 7.96E-01 9.67E+08 
9.20E-04 7.98E+10 8.60E-02 4.94E+11 5.64E-01 2.72E+10 8.45E-01 1.05E+10 
7.00E-03 0.00E+00 8.62E-02 1.54E+08 5.69E-01 3.59E+10 8.46E-01 1.12E+09 
7.20E-03 4.95E+09 8.65E-02 9.26E+09 5.70E-01 5.01E+10 8.50E-01 1.45E+09 
8.50E-03 0.00E+00 8.67E-02 3.16E+10 5.82E-01 8.62E+10 8.51E-01 4.55E+08 
8.70E-03 2.24E+11 1.00E-01 4.10E+11 5.83E-01 1.69E+09 8.73E-01 7.99E+09 
9.20E-03 0.00E+00 1.01E-01 5.12E+10 5.91E-01 5.74E+10 8.74E-01 2.31E+10 
9.40E-03 2.46E+10 1.05E-01 5.46E+10 5.92E-01 9.40E+09 8.92E-01 6.53E+09 
1.02E-02 0.00E+00 1.06E-01 2.10E+10 6.04E-01 8.62E+10 8.93E-01 9.67E+08 
1.06E-02 1.16E+08 1.23E-01 2.32E+11 6.05E-01 3.17E+11 9.04E-01 3.99E+09 
1.10E-02 0.00E+00 1.24E-01 8.72E+10 6.25E-01 1.44E+11 9.05E-01 1.69E+09 
1.14E-02 3.05E+09 1.27E-01 4.10E+10 6.26E-01 6.07E+08 9.96E-01 3.30E+10 
2.00E-02 8.05E+12 1.28E-01 4.12E+10 6.61E-01 2.51E+11 9.97E-01 2.00E+10 
2.64E-02 1.19E+12 1.50E-01 3.01E+11 6.62E-01 1.22E+13 1.00E+00 1.09E+09 
2.66E-02 3.27E+08 1.88E-01 2.03E+11 6.76E-01 1.01E+11 1.00E+00 1.22E+08 
2.74E-02 1.49E+11 1.89E-01 4.55E+08 6.77E-01 3.03E+08 1.01E+00 3.40E+10 
2.76E-02 1.71E+09 2.47E-01 3.10E+11 6.92E-01 1.08E+11 1.04E+00 1.01E+09 
2.86E-02 1.86E+11 2.48E-01 1.31E+10 6.93E-01 3.39E+09 1.04E+00 3.25E+09 
2.88E-02 2.09E+09 3.00E-01 2.78E+11 7.15E-01 1.58E+11 1.12E+00 2.41E+09 
3.00E-02 2.24E+11 4.01E-01 2.63E+11 7.16E-01 3.60E+08 1.12E+00 2.09E+08 
3.17E-02 2.56E+11 4.02E-01 3.60E+08 7.23E-01 5.03E+10 1.13E+00 2.75E+08 
3.19E-02 1.06E+10 4.44E-01 1.09E+11 7.24E-01 3.81E+10 1.13E+00 6.07E+08 
3.57E-02 5.73E+11 4.45E-01 1.06E+09 7.50E-01 1.87E+11 1.14E+00 3.36E+08 
3.59E-02 2.46E+10 4.50E-01 1.30E+10 7.56E-01 2.18E+09 1.14E+00 4.55E+08 
4.50E-02 1.37E+12 4.75E-01 1.80E+11 7.57E-01 8.61E+09 1.17E+00 7.93E+08 
4.53E-02 1.31E+09 4.76E-01 4.74E+09 7.95E-01 1.38E+10 1.17E+00 5.84E+09 
6.00E-02 8.36E+11 4.78E-01 1.44E+10 7.96E-01 2.77E+11 1.17E+00 1.53E+08 
6.02E-02 1.17E+09 4.79E-01 4.17E+08 7.56E-01 1.82E+09 1.17E+00 2.98E+10 
6.80E-02 4.43E+11 5.57E-01 5.60E+11 7.57E-01 2.83E+10 1.24E+00 2.04E+09 
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Energy 
(MeV) 
Photon 
Source 
Strength 
(γ/s) 
Energy 
(MeV) 
Photon 
Source 
Strength 
(γ /s) 
Energy 
(MeV) 
Photon 
Source 
Strength 
(γ /s) 
Energy 
(MeV) 
Photon 
Source 
Strength 
(γ /s) 
1.24E+00 2.46E+08 1.33E+00 2.98E+10 1.50E+00 1.53E+08 3.00E+00 3.57E+07 
1.25E+00 1.22E+08 1.37E+00 9.76E+08 1.60E+00 9.35E+08 4.00E+00 3.33E+06 
1.25E+00 1.63E+09 1.37E+00 9.87E+09 1.60E+00 3.39E+09 6.00E+00 2.52E+03 
1.27E+00 8.24E+08 1.49E+00 3.91E+09 2.00E+00 3.93E+09 8.00E+00 2.89E+02 
1.28E+00 6.64E+10 1.50E+00 1.33E+09 2.50E+00 6.79E+08 1.10E+01 3.31E+01 
1.33E+00 1.74E+09       
 
 Table XXI: Neutron energy group and respective source strength. 
Energy 
(MeV) 
Neutron 
Source 
Strength 
(n/s) 
Energy 
(MeV) 
Neutron 
Source 
Strength 
(n/s) 
Energy 
(MeV) 
Neutron 
Source 
Strength 
(n/s) 
Energy 
(MeV) 
Neutron 
Source 
Strength 
(n/s) 
0.00E+00 0.00E+00 5.04E-06 7.52E-05 1.06E-02 4.68E+00 2.13E-01 1.36E+02 
5.00E-10 1.89E-09 6.48E-06 1.08E-04 1.17E-02 3.76E+00 2.24E-01 1.46E+02 
2.00E-09 2.95E-09 8.32E-06 1.57E-04 1.50E-02 1.23E+01 2.35E-01 1.56E+02 
5.00E-09 5.39E-09 1.07E-05 2.26E-04 1.93E-02 1.79E+01 2.47E-01 1.67E+02 
1.00E-08 1.22E-08 1.37E-05 3.28E-04 2.19E-02 1.18E+01 2.73E-01 3.69E+02 
1.45E-08 1.43E-08 1.76E-05 4.74E-04 2.36E-02 8.20E+00 2.87E-01 2.04E+02 
2.10E-08 2.51E-08 2.26E-05 6.87E-04 2.42E-02 2.95E+00 2.95E-01 1.07E+02 
3.00E-08 4.19E-08 2.90E-05 9.97E-04 2.48E-02 3.06E+00 2.97E-01 3.99E+01 
4.00E-08 5.48E-08 3.73E-05 1.45E-03 2.61E-02 6.48E+00 2.99E-01 1.90E+01 
5.00E-08 6.22E-08 4.79E-05 2.19E-03 2.70E-02 4.90E+00 3.02E-01 5.18E+01 
7.00E-08 1.44E-07 6.14E-05 3.29E-03 2.85E-02 7.97E+00 3.34E-01 4.82E+02 
1.00E-07 2.57E-07 7.89E-05 4.76E-03 3.18E-02 1.84E+01 3.69E-01 5.48E+02 
1.25E-07 2.47E-07 1.01E-04 6.89E-03 3.43E-02 1.44E+01 3.88E-01 3.02E+02 
1.50E-07 2.73E-07 1.30E-04 1.00E-02 4.09E-02 4.03E+01 4.08E-01 3.23E+02 
1.84E-07 5.54E-07 1.67E-04 1.45E-02 4.63E-02 3.59E+01 4.51E-01 7.11E+02 
2.25E-07 7.42E-07 2.15E-04 2.09E-02 5.25E-02 4.31E+01 4.98E-01 8.04E+02 
2.75E-07 9.76E-07 2.75E-04 3.03E-02 5.66E-02 2.99E+01 5.23E-01 4.40E+02 
3.25E-07 1.05E-06 3.54E-04 4.43E-02 6.74E-02 8.38E+01 5.50E-01 4.66E+02 
3.67E-07 9.25E-07 4.54E-04 6.42E-02 7.20E-02 3.78E+01 5.78E-01 4.94E+02 
4.14E-07 1.10E-06 5.83E-04 9.26E-02 7.95E-02 6.38E+01 6.08E-01 5.23E+02 
5.00E-07 2.13E-06 7.49E-04 1.35E-01 8.25E-02 2.63E+01 6.39E-01 5.53E+02 
5.32E-07 8.21E-07 9.61E-04 1.96E-01 8.65E-02 3.59E+01 6.72E-01 5.84E+02 
6.25E-07 2.55E-06 1.23E-03 2.87E-01 9.80E-02 1.07E+02 7.07E-01 6.17E+02 
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Energy 
(MeV) 
Neutron 
Source 
Strength 
(n/s) 
Energy 
(MeV) 
Neutron 
Source 
Strength 
(n/s) 
Energy 
(MeV) 
Neutron 
Source 
Strength 
(n/s) 
Energy 
(MeV) 
Neutron 
Source 
Strength 
(n/s) 
6.83E-07 1.65E-06 1.23E-01 6.27E+01 1.74E+00 1.43E+03 6.59E+00 1.40E+02 
8.00E-07 3.55E-06 1.29E-01 6.75E+01 1.83E+00 1.49E+03 6.70E+00 6.30E+01 
8.76E-07 2.43E-06 1.36E-01 7.26E+01 1.92E+00 1.57E+03 7.05E+00 1.64E+02 
1.00E-06 4.13E-06 1.43E-01 7.78E+01 2.02E+00 1.63E+03 7.41E+00 1.31E+02 
1.04E-06 1.39E-06 1.50E-01 8.37E+01 2.12E+00 1.69E+03 7.79E+00 1.03E+02 
1.08E-06 1.41E-06 1.58E-01 8.98E+01 2.23E+00 1.76E+03 8.19E+00 7.95E+01 
1.13E-06 1.62E-06 1.66E-01 9.65E+01 2.31E+00 1.21E+03 8.61E+00 6.01E+01 
1.30E-06 6.52E-06 1.74E-01 1.03E+02 2.35E+00 6.10E+02 9.05E+00 4.46E+01 
1.45E-06 5.71E-06 1.83E-01 1.11E+02 2.37E+00 3.07E+02 9.51E+00 3.23E+01 
1.86E-06 1.75E-05 1.93E-01 1.19E+02 2.39E+00 3.10E+02 1.00E+01 2.30E+01 
2.38E-06 2.52E-05 2.02E-01 1.27E+02 2.47E+00 1.24E+03 1.05E+01 1.59E+01 
3.06E-06 3.62E-05 7.43E-01 6.53E+02 2.59E+00 1.87E+03 1.11E+01 1.08E+01 
3.93E-06 5.21E-05 7.81E-01 6.89E+02 2.73E+00 1.86E+03 1.16E+01 7.08E+00 
1.59E-03 4.20E-01 8.21E-01 7.25E+02 2.87E+00 1.83E+03 1.22E+01 4.55E+00 
2.04E-03 6.07E-01 8.63E-01 7.64E+02 3.01E+00 1.75E+03 1.25E+01 1.59E+00 
2.25E-03 3.13E-01 9.07E-01 8.03E+02 3.17E+00 1.65E+03 1.28E+01 1.24E+00 
2.49E-03 3.64E-01 9.62E-01 9.87E+02 3.33E+00 1.54E+03 1.35E+01 1.71E+00 
2.61E-03 2.03E-01 1.00E+00 7.43E+02 3.68E+00 2.64E+03 1.38E+01 5.69E-01 
2.75E-03 2.19E-01 1.11E+00 1.90E+03 4.07E+00 2.02E+03 1.42E+01 4.33E-01 
3.04E-03 4.93E-01 1.17E+00 1.02E+03 4.49E+00 1.48E+03 1.46E+01 3.25E-01 
3.36E-03 5.72E-01 1.23E+00 1.07E+03 4.72E+00 6.02E+02 1.49E+01 2.42E-01 
3.71E-03 6.63E-01 1.29E+00 1.12E+03 4.97E+00 5.34E+02 1.57E+01 3.10E-01 
4.31E-03 1.21E+00 1.35E+00 1.16E+03 5.22E+00 4.70E+02 1.65E+01 1.63E-01 
5.53E-03 2.73E+00 1.42E+00 1.21E+03 5.49E+00 4.07E+02 1.69E+01 4.86E-02 
7.10E-03 3.98E+00 1.50E+00 1.27E+03 5.77E+00 3.48E+02 1.73E+01 3.41E-02 
9.12E-03 5.78E+00 1.57E+00 1.32E+03 6.07E+00 2.94E+02 1.96E+01 6.39E-02 
1.11E-01 1.29E+02 1.65E+00 1.38E+03 6.38E+00 2.46E+02 2.00E+01 2.53E-03 
1.17E-01 5.84E+01       
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APPENDIX B 
CANDU Fuel Material Composition 
Natural Uranium Grams/tU 
234U 55.0 
235U 7115.0 
238U 992830.0 
Impurities in CANDU Fuel Material 
Elements Grams/tU Elements Grams/tU 
Oxygen 134454.0 Vanadium 3.0 
Lithium 1.0 Chromium 4.0 
Boron 1.0 Manganese 1.7 
Carbon 86.4 Iron 18.0 
Nitrogen 25.0 Cobalt 1.0 
Fluorine 10.7 Nickel 24.0 
Sodium 15.0 Copper 1.0 
Magnesium 2.0 Zinc 40.3 
Aluminium 16.7 Molybdenum 10.0 
Silicon 12.1 Silver 0.1 
Phosphorus 35.0 Cadmium 25.0 
Chlorine 5.3 Indium 2.0 
Calcium 2.0 Tin 4.0 
Titanium 1.0 Gadolinium 2.5 
Lead 1.0 Tungsten 2.0 
Bismuth 0.4 
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APPENDIX C 
Cladding (Zircaloy-4) Material Composition 
Elements Grams/kg Elements Grams/kg 
Zirconium 979.11 Hafnium 0.078 
Tin 16 Hydrogen 0.013 
Iron 2.25 Manganese 0.02 
Chromium 1.25 Nitrogen 0.08 
Nickel 0.02 Oxygen 0.95 
Aluminium 0.024 Sulfur 0.035 
Boron 0.00033 Titanium 0.02 
Cadmium 0.00025 Tungsten 0.02 
Carbon 0.12 Vanadium 0.02 
Cobalt 0.01 Uranium 0.0002 
Copper 0.02 
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APPENDIX D 
MCNP input of a CANDU6 Fuel bundle 
CANDU6 37 Element Fuel Bundle 
    1     1 -10.1154 -2   4 -5      $ fuel pellet 
    2     2 -6.55     2  -3  4 -5   $ clad 
    3     1 -10.1154 -8   4 -5      $ fuel pellet 
    4     2 -6.55     8  -9  4 -5   $ clad 
    5     1 -10.1154 -11  4 -5      $ fuel pellet 
    6     2 -6.55     11 -12 4 -5   $ clad 
    7     1 -10.1154 -14  4 -5      $ fuel pellet 
    8     2 -6.55     14 -15 4 -5   $ clad 
    9     1 -10.1154 -17  4 -5      $ fuel pellet 
   10     2 -6.55     17 -18 4 -5   $ clad 
   11     1 -10.1154 -20  4 -5      $ fuel pellet 
   12     2 -6.55     20 -21 4 -5   $ clad 
   13     1 -10.1154 -23  4 -5      $ fuel pellet 
   14     2 -6.55     23 -24 4 -5   $ clad 
   15     1 -10.1154 -26  4 -5      $ fuel pellet 
   16     2 -6.55     26 -27 4 -5   $ clad 
   17     1 -10.1154 -29  4 -5      $ fuel pellet 
   18     2 -6.55     29 -30 4 -5   $ clad 
   19     1 -10.1154 -32  4 -5      $ fuel pellet 
   20     2 -6.55     32 -33 4 -5   $ clad 
   21     1 -10.1154 -35  4 -5      $ fuel pellet 
   22     2 -6.55     35 -36 4 -5   $ clad 
   23     1 -10.1154 -38  4 -5      $ fuel pellet 
   24     2 -6.55     38 -39 4 -5   $ clad 
   25     1 -10.1154 -41  4 -5      $ fuel pellet 
   26     2 -6.55     41 -42 4 -5   $ clad 
   27     1 -10.1154 -44  4 -5      $ fuel pellet 
   28     2 -6.55 44 -45  4 -5      $ clad 
   29     1 -10.1154 -47  4 -5      $ fuel pellet 
   30     2 -6.55 47 -48  4 -5      $ clad 
   31     1 -10.1154 -50  4 -5      $ fuel pellet 
   32     2 -6.55     50 -51 4 -5   $ clad 
   33     1 -10.1154 -53  4 -5      $ fuel pellet 
   34     2 -6.55     53 -54 4 -5   $ clad 
   35     1 -10.1154 -56  4 -5      $ fuel pellet 
   36     2 -6.55     56 -57 4 -5   $ clad 
   37     1 -10.1154 -59  4 -5      $ fuel pellet 
   38     2 -6.55     59 -60 4 -5   $ clad 
   39     1 -10.1154 -62  4 -5      $ fuel pellet 
   40     2 -6.55 62 -63  4 -5      $ clad 
   41     1 -10.1154 -65  4 -5      $ fuel pellet 
   42     2 -6.55     65 -66 4 -5   $ clad 
   43     1 -10.1154 -68  4 -5      $ fuel pellet 
 76 
   44     2 -6.55     68 -69  4 -5  $ clad 
   45     1 -10.1154 -71  4  -5     $ fuel pellet 
   46     2 -6.55     71 -72  4 -5  $ clad 
   47     1 -10.1154 -74  4  -5     $ fuel pellet 
   48     2 -6.55 74 -75  4  -5     $ clad 
   49     1 -10.1154 -77  4  -5     $ fuel pellet 
   50     2 -6.55     77 -78  4 -5  $ clad 
   51     1 -10.1154 -80  4  -5     $ fuel pellet 
   52     2 -6.55     80 -81  4 -5  $ clad 
   53     1 -10.1154 -83  4  -5     $ fuel pellet 
   54     2 -6.55     83 -84  4 -5  $ clad 
   55     1 -10.1154 -86  4  -5     $ fuel pellet 
   56     2 -6.55     86 -87  4 -5  $ clad 
   57     1 -10.1154 -89  4  -5     $ fuel pellet 
   58     2 -6.55     89 -90  4 -5  $ clad 
   59     1 -10.1154 -92  4  -5     $ fuel pellet 
   60     2 -6.55     92 -93  4 -5  $ clad 
   61     1 -10.1154 -95  4  -5     $ fuel pellet 
   62     2 -6.55     95 -96  4 -5  $ clad 
   63     1 -10.1154 -98  4  -5     $ fuel pellet 
   64     2 -6.55     98 -99  4 -5  $ clad 
   65     1 -10.1154 -101 4  -5     $ fuel pellet 
   66     2 -6.55     101 -102 4 -5 $ clad 
   67     1 -10.1154 -104  4  -5    $ fuel pellet 
   68     2 -6.55     104 -105 4 -5 $ clad 
   69     1 -10.1154 -107  4  -5    $ fuel pellet 
   70     2 -6.55     107 -108 4 -5 $ clad 
   71     1 -10.1154 -110  4  -5    $ fuel pellet 
   72     2 -6.55     110 -111 4 -5 $ clad 
   73     1 -10.1154 -113  4  -5    $ fuel pellet 
   74     2 -6.55     113 -114 4 -5 $ clad 
   75     0 3 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 $ outside fuel pins 
          36 39 42 45 48 51 54 57 60 63 66 69 72 75 78 81 
          84 87 90 93 96 99 102 105 108 111 114 (-6 4 -5) 
c HPGe modeling starts 
  201     0         -201            $ void inside Ge 
  202     3   -5.32  201 -202       $ Ge 
  203     4  -0.535  202 -203       $ Li (0.5mm) 
  204     0          203 -204 #206  $ 5mm gap 
  205     5    -2.7  204 -205       $ Al 
  206     5    -2.7 -206  207 -208  $ Al cap for detector 
c empty space after fuel bundle; HPGe location) 
  207     0    6 -209 4 -5 #201 #202 #203 #204 #205 #206  
  208     0        209:-4 :5        $ outside world 
 
    1        cz 0.6075              $ fuel outer 
    2        cz 0.61175             $ clad air gap outer 
    3        cz 0.65375             $ clad outer 
    4        pz -24.75              $ fuel pin bottom 
 77 
    5        pz 24.75               $ fuel pin top 
    6        cz 12 
c 1st ring radius 1.4885 (6 pins)                                                
    7       c/z  1.4885  0 0.6075  
    8       c/z  1.4885  0 0.61175  
    9       c/z  1.4885  0 0.65375  
   10       c/z -1.4885  0 0.6075  
   11       c/z -1.4885  0 0.61175  
   12       c/z -1.4885  0 0.65375  
   13       c/z  0.74425 1.289079 0.6075  
   14       c/z  0.74425 1.289079 0.61175  
   15       c/z  0.74425 1.289079 0.65375  
   16       c/z -0.74425 1.289079 0.6075  
   17       c/z -0.74425 1.289079 0.61175  
   18       c/z -0.74425 1.289079 0.65375  
   19       c/z  0.74425 -1.289079 0.6075  
   20       c/z  0.74425 -1.289079 0.61175  
   21       c/z  0.74425 -1.289079 0.65375  
   22       c/z -0.74425 -1.289079 0.6075  
   23       c/z -0.74425 -1.289079 0.61175  
   24       c/z -0.74425 -1.289079 0.65375  
c 2nd ring radius 2.8755 (12 pins)                                               
   25       c/z  2.77579 0.74425 0.6075  
   26       c/z  2.77579 0.74425 0.61175  
   27       c/z  2.77579 0.74425 0.65375  
   28       c/z  2.77579 -0.74425 0.6075  
   29       c/z  2.77579 -0.74425 0.61175  
   30       c/z  2.77579 -0.74425 0.65375  
   31       c/z -2.77579 0.74425 0.6075  
   32       c/z -2.77579 0.74425 0.61175  
   33       c/z -2.77579 0.74425 0.65375  
   34       c/z -2.77579 -0.74425 0.6075  
   35       c/z -2.77579 -0.74425 0.61175  
   36       c/z -2.77579 -0.74425 0.65375  
   37       c/z  0.74425 2.777579 0.6075  
   38       c/z  0.74425 2.777579 0.61175  
   39       c/z  0.74425 2.777579 0.65375  
   40       c/z  0.74425 -2.777579 0.6075  
   41       c/z  0.74425 -2.777579 0.61175  
   42       c/z  0.74425 -2.777579 0.65375  
   43       c/z -0.74425 2.777579 0.6075  
   44       c/z -0.74425 2.777579 0.61175  
   45       c/z -0.74425 2.777579 0.65375  
   46       c/z -0.74425 -2.777579 0.6075  
   47       c/z -0.74425 -2.777579 0.61175  
   48       c/z -0.74425 -2.777579 0.65375  
   49       c/z  2.033329 1.933618 0.6075  
   50       c/z  2.033329 1.933618 0.61175  
   51       c/z  2.033329 1.933618 0.65375  
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   52       c/z -2.033329 1.933618 0.6075  
   53       c/z -2.033329 1.933618 0.61175  
   54       c/z -2.033329 1.933618 0.65375  
   55       c/z  2.033329 -1.933618 0.6075  
   56       c/z  2.033329 -1.933618 0.61175  
   57       c/z  2.033329 -1.933618 0.65375  
   58       c/z -2.033329 -1.933618 0.6075  
   59       c/z -2.033329 -1.933618 0.61175  
   60       c/z -2.033329 -1.933618 0.65375  
c 3rd ring radius 4.3305 (18 pins)                                               
   61       c/z  0.74425 4.266079 0.6075  
   62       c/z  0.74425 4.266079 0.61175  
   63       c/z  0.74425 4.266079 0.65375  
   64       c/z  0.74425 -4.266079 0.6075  
   65       c/z  0.74425 -4.266079 0.61175  
   66       c/z  0.74425 -4.266079 0.65375  
   67       c/z -0.74425 4.266079 0.6075  
   68       c/z -0.74425 4.266079 0.61175  
   69       c/z -0.74425 4.266079 0.65375  
   70       c/z -0.74425 -4.266079 0.6075  
   71       c/z -0.74425 -4.266079 0.61175  
   72       c/z -0.74425 -4.266079 0.65375  
   73       c/z  4.3305 0 0.6075  
   74       c/z  4.3305 0 0.61175  
   75       c/z  4.3305 0 0.65375  
   76       c/z -4.3305 0 0.6075  
   77       c/z -4.3305 0 0.61175  
   78       c/z -4.3305 0 0.65375  
   79       c/z  2.16525 3.750323 0.6075  
   80       c/z  2.16525 3.750323 0.61175  
   81       c/z  2.16525 3.750323 0.65375  
   82       c/z -2.16525 3.750323 0.6075  
   83       c/z -2.16525 3.750323 0.61175  
   84       c/z -2.16525 3.750323 0.65375  
   85       c/z  2.16525 -3.750323 0.6075  
   86       c/z  2.16525 -3.750323 0.61175  
   87       c/z  2.16525 -3.750323 0.65375  
   88       c/z -2.16525 -3.750323 0.6075  
   89       c/z -2.16525 -3.750323 0.61175  
   90       c/z -2.16525 -3.750323 0.65375  
   91       c/z  4.066658 1.4885 0.6075  
   92       c/z  4.066658 1.4885 0.61175  
   93       c/z  4.066658 1.4885 0.65375  
   94       c/z  4.066658 -1.4885 0.6075  
   95       c/z  4.066658 -1.4885 0.61175  
   96       c/z  4.066658 -1.4885 0.65375  
   97       c/z -4.066658 1.4885 0.6075  
   98       c/z -4.066658 1.4885 0.61175  
   99       c/z -4.066658 1.4885 0.65375  
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  100       c/z -4.066658 -1.4885 0.6075  
  101       c/z -4.066658 -1.4885 0.61175  
  102       c/z -4.066658 -1.4885 0.65375  
  103       c/z  3.32142 2.78923 0.6075  
  104       c/z  3.32142 2.78923 0.61175  
  105       c/z  3.32142 2.78923 0.65375  
  106       c/z  3.32142 -2.78923 0.6075  
  107       c/z  3.32142 -2.78923 0.61175  
  108       c/z  3.32142 -2.78923 0.65375  
  109       c/z -3.32142 2.78923 0.6075  
  110       c/z -3.32142 2.78923 0.61175  
  111       c/z -3.32142 2.78923 0.65375  
  112       c/z -3.32142 -2.78923 0.6075  
  113       c/z -3.32142 -2.78923 0.61175  
  114       c/z -3.32142 -2.78923 0.65375  
c HPGe surfaces 
  201       rcc -20 0 0 2.38125 0 0 0.68  
  202       rcc -20 0 0 6.15 0 0 3.25  
  203       rcc -20 0 0 6.2 0 0 3.3  
  204       rcc -20 0 0 6.7 0 0 3.8  
  205       rcc -20 0 0 6.85 0 0 3.95  
  206        cx  3.3  
  207        px -13.7  
  208        px -13.6 
  209        cz  100   
 
mode p 
sdef pos=d1 rad=d2 axs=0 0 1 ext=d3 erg=d4 
si1 L  0         0          0  
       1.4885    0          0 
      -1.4885    0          0 
       0.74425   1.289079   0  
      -0.74425   1.289079   0  
       0.74425  -1.289079   0  
      -0.74425  -1.289079   0  
       2.77579   0.74425    0 
       2.77579  -0.74425    0  
      -2.77579   0.74425    0  
      -2.77579  -0.74425    0  
       0.74425   2.777579   0  
       0.74425  -2.777579   0  
      -0.74425   2.777579   0  
      -0.74425  -2.777579   0 
       2.033329  1.933618   0  
      -2.033329  1.933618   0  
       2.033329 -1.933618   0  
      -2.033329 -1.933618   0  
       0.74425   4.266079   0   
       0.74425  -4.266079   0   
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      -0.74425   4.266079   0   
      -0.74425  -4.266079   0  
       4.3305    0          0        
      -4.3305    0          0        
       2.16525   3.750323   0        
      -2.16525   3.750323   0        
       2.16525  -3.750323   0        
      -2.16525  -3.750323   0        
       4.066658  1.4885     0        
       4.066658 -1.4885     0        
      -4.066658  1.4885     0        
      -4.066658 -1.4885     0        
       3.32142   2.78923    0        
       3.32142  -2.78923    0        
      -3.32142   2.78923    0         
      -3.32142  -2.78923    0        
sp1 D 1 36r 
si2 0 0.65375 
sp2 -21 1 
si3 -24.75 24.75 
sp3 0 1 
si4 H 0.0000E+00  9.0000E-04   9.2000E-04   7.0000E-03 
      7.2000E-03  8.5000E-03   8.7000E-03   9.2000E-03 
      9.4000E-03  1.0200E-02   1.0600E-02   1.1000E-02 
      1.1400E-02  2.0000E-02   2.6400E-02   2.6600E-02 
      2.7400E-02  2.7600E-02   2.8600E-02   2.8800E-02 
      3.0000E-02  3.1700E-02   3.1900E-02   3.5700E-02 
      3.5900E-02  4.5000E-02   4.5300E-02   6.0000E-02 
      6.0200E-02  6.8000E-02   6.8200E-02   7.0000E-02 
      8.6000E-02  8.6200E-02   8.6500E-02   8.6700E-02 
      1.0000E-01  1.0100E-01   1.0500E-01   1.0600E-01 
      1.2300E-01  1.2400E-01   1.2700E-01   1.2800E-01 
      1.5000E-01  1.8800E-01   1.8900E-01   2.4700E-01 
      2.4800E-01  3.0000E-01   4.0100E-01   4.0200E-01 
      4.4400E-01  4.4500E-01   4.5000E-01   4.7500E-01 
      4.7600E-01  4.7800E-01   4.7900E-01   5.5700E-01 
      5.5800E-01  5.6300E-01   5.6400E-01   5.6900E-01 
      5.7000E-01  5.8200E-01   5.8300E-01   5.9100E-01 
      5.9200E-01  6.0400E-01   6.0500E-01   6.2500E-01 
      6.2600E-01  6.6100E-01   6.6200E-01   6.7600E-01 
      6.7700E-01  6.9200E-01   6.9300E-01   7.1500E-01 
      7.1600E-01  7.2300E-01   7.2400E-01   7.5000E-01 
      7.5600E-01  7.5700E-01   7.9500E-01   7.9600E-01 
      8.0100E-01  8.0200E-01   8.1500E-01   8.1600E-01 
      8.4500E-01  8.4600E-01   8.5000E-01   8.5100E-01 
      8.7300E-01  8.7400E-01   8.9200E-01   8.9300E-01 
      9.0400E-01  9.0500E-01   9.9600E-01   9.9700E-01 
      1.0000E+00  1.0040E+00   1.0050E+00   1.0380E+00 
      1.0390E+00  1.1180E+00   1.1190E+00   1.1280E+00 
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      1.1290E+00  1.1400E+00   1.1410E+00   1.1670E+00 
      1.1680E+00  1.1730E+00   1.1740E+00   1.2410E+00 
      1.2420E+00  1.2460E+00   1.2470E+00   1.2740E+00 
      1.2750E+00  1.3320E+00   1.3330E+00   1.3650E+00 
      1.3660E+00  1.4940E+00   1.4950E+00   1.5000E+00 
      1.5960E+00  1.5970E+00   2.0000E+00   2.5000E+00 
      3.0000E+00  4.0000E+00   6.0000E+00   8.0000E+00 
      1.1000E+01 
sp4 D 0.0000E+00  0.0000E+00  1.9938E+11  0.0000E+00 
      1.2360E+10  0.0000E+00  5.6024E+11  0.0000E+00 
      6.1565E+10  0.0000E+00  2.1944E+08  0.0000E+00 
      5.9399E+09  8.0786E+12  1.9544E+12  6.2174E+08 
      2.4430E+11  4.2622E+09  3.0538E+11  5.2094E+09 
      3.6645E+11  2.7567E+11  2.6568E+10  6.1620E+11 
      6.1565E+10  1.4756E+12  2.4870E+09  9.3203E+11 
      2.2127E+09  4.9455E+11  1.7522E+11  1.1413E+11 
      5.1311E+11  2.9258E+08  9.6208E+09  5.9980E+10 
      4.2652E+11  1.2787E+11  3.2724E+10  3.9864E+10 
      1.3908E+11  2.1785E+11  2.4543E+10  8.0252E+10 
      1.7998E+11  2.2621E+11  1.1366E+09  3.4527E+11 
      3.2724E+10  3.0955E+11  6.3163E+11  8.9980E+08 
      2.6266E+11  2.6520E+09  3.1269E+10  2.3272E+11 
      9.2258E+09  1.8618E+10  1.0419E+09  7.2610E+11 
      1.2787E+09  4.6545E+10  5.2953E+10  4.6545E+10 
      9.7502E+10  1.1171E+11  4.2148E+09  7.4471E+10       
      2.3489E+10  1.1171E+11  6.1674E+11  1.8618E+11 
      1.5154E+09  3.2581E+11  1.1980E+13  1.3032E+11 
      7.5772E+08  1.3963E+11  8.4770E+09  2.0480E+11 
      8.9980E+08  6.5162E+10  9.5237E+10  2.4203E+11 
      2.5426E+09  2.1500E+10  1.6103E+10  5.3964E+11 
      2.1188E+09  5.5165E+10  5.5090E+09  2.4152E+09 
      1.2289E+10  2.7941E+09  1.6951E+09  1.1366E+09 
      9.3229E+09  5.7777E+10  7.6278E+09  2.4152E+09 
      4.6615E+09  4.2148E+09  3.8563E+10  4.9868E+10 
      1.2713E+09  8.8768E+07  8.4818E+10  7.3234E+08 
      6.3190E+09  1.7532E+09  5.2094E+08  1.9973E+08 
      1.5154E+09  2.4411E+08  1.1366E+09  5.7699E+08 
      1.1374E+10  1.1096E+08  3.7978E+12  1.4869E+09 
      6.1565E+08  8.8768E+07  4.0728E+09  5.9919E+08 
      1.6575E+11  1.2649E+09  3.7986E+12  7.1015E+08 
      1.9210E+10  2.8406E+09  3.3150E+09  1.1096E+08 
      3.0149E+08  8.4770E+09  1.2656E+09  1.1341E+09 
      5.4861E+07  7.0688E+06  2.1946E+03  2.5133E+02 
      2.8819E+01 
m1    92000     -0.88148      $ UO2 
      8016      -0.11852 
m2    40000     -0.9817       $ Zirc-4 
      50123     -0.01604  
      26056     -0.00226 
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m3    32000     -1            $ Ge 
m4    3000      -1            $ Li 
m5    13000     -1            $ Al 
imp:p             1 81r                    0 
f8:p 202 
ft8 GEB .0024 -.0014 -.6834 
e8 0 1e-3 0.01 2747i 11.002 
c fm8 4.4e+13 
prdmp 1e8 1e8 
nps 1e9 
print 
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